1404

AN INTRODUCTION TO Moral Philoſophy.

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Socratem illum ſolitum aiunt dicere, perfectum ſibi opus eſſe, ſiquis ſatis eſſet concitatus cohortatione ſuâ ad ſtudium cognoſcendæ percipiendæque virtutis; quibus enim id perſuaſum eſſet, ut nihil mallent ſe eſſe, quàm bonos viros, iis reliquam facilem eſſe doctrinam. Cic. de Orat. L. 1. §. 204.

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THE PREFACE.

ALthough there is no great merit in compiling a Compendium of any Science, no great praiſe either of Invention or Erudition to be obtained thereby, yet the uſefulneſs of ſuch little works is not to be denied: For they give the young Student a general view of the ſubject, which is recommended to his conſideration, and ſerve ſomething of the ſame purpoſe as the Landſcape of a Country to an unexperienced Traveller.

In this view, the young Adventurer into the extenſive and important Science of Morality will kindly accept my offering Him ſome previous, though but ſuperficial, knowledge of it, and of the relation which its ſeveral parts bear to each other. He is not to expect any thing here ſuggeſted by way of refinement or going beyond the plain obvious appearances of things, but ſuch as may be ſuppoſed to lie within the apprehenſion of common ſenſe, as diſtinguiſhed from ſuperiour capacity and improvement: For indeed it would be prepoſterous to direct him to the abſtruſe difficulties of this or any other Science, before he is ſuppoſed to have maſter'd the firſt principles of it. And as this ſubject has not exerciſed the attention of ſerious and good men in any Country, I believe, more

more ſucceſsfully than in our own, I have made no ſcruple of borrowing any aſſiſtance that chanc'd to fall in my way, not only as to ſentiment, but even expreſſion: At the ſame time I have taken the liberty of making great alterations in what I have borrowed, in order to accommodate it to my purpoſe; ſo that a reference to the pages (did I recollect them) could anſwer no other end, but that of gratifying the curioſity of ſome perſons, and thereby perhaps of expoſing myſelf to the cenſure of diſguiſing and maiming a good Author. — And as I am ſo little concerned in the invention of what is offered in the following Introduction, *I may venture to ſay that a great part of it is worth conſidering. Whether it is put together in ſuch a manner as will anſwer any uſeful purpoſe, is another queſtion.*

It would however be an unpardonable omiſſion not to acknowledge myſelf greatly beholden to the Sermons *and* Analogy *of Dr* Butler, *the preſent* Lord Biſhop *of* BRISTOL, *or not to recommend them to the ſtudious Reader, when he ſhall have maſter'd the common evidence which is uſually offer'd in ſupport of* Morality *in general, and of* Chriſtianity *in particular. --- It is true, that thoſe excellent Books contain many things well ſuited to general apprehenſion, and very uſeful to ſettle our notions of morality upon a rational bottom, and to lead us from thence to the acknowledgment of ſuch doctrines as are properly Chriſtian; ſeveral of which I have inſerted in the following* Introduction. *But it is no leſs certain, that thoſe performances, being the produce of mature thought, extenſive obſervation, and*

ſtrong

ſtrong penetration in the Writer, muſt require ſome ſhare of each in the Reader. 'Tis therefore no wonder if They, to whom his Lordſhip *does not addreſs himſelf, --- if Novices in thinking, at one time complain of the Reflections and Reaſonings as abſtruſe, at another affect to deſpiſe them for being trite and obvious. In the mean while the judicious Reader will ſee enough to convince him, that in the former caſe the blame ought to revert upon the Cenſurer's own inattention and unacquaintance with the circumſtances of human nature, and of the preſent ſtate of Religion among Ourſelves; and as to the latter, --- He will be apt to think, that nothing ought to be deſpis'd as trite or frivolous, which can be rendered ſubſervient to the noble purpoſes of effectually invalidating objections, removing difficulties, and ſatisfying many of the doubts which are apt to attend and diſquiet thoughtful minds in their Religious and Moral Speculations: --- He will obſerve with pleaſure how ſurprizingly the truths made known by the Chriſtian Revelation harmonize with the Conſtitution of things in the Natural World; Nor can He eaſily fail of improving his heart, as well as underſtanding, by that rich vein of Piety and Goodneſs, which glows throughout the whole performances; and which being all along ſupported by ſolid argument, will bear preſſing home upon the thought, without giving diſtaſte to the cooleſt Reaſoner.*

I have had a general regard to the Plan uſually received in the Schools, becauſe I think it the moſt commodious; and becauſe the new, and ſeemingly more ſcientifical, method attended with all the

the Mathematical formalities of Definitions, Poſtulatums, Axioms, Lemmas, Theorems, *and* Corollaries *(all very aſtoniſhing to a young Reader) ſeems to me forced and affected upon this ſubject; and not ſo likely to anſwer the good purpoſe of clearing up any doubtful propoſition, as to perplex Him in the apprehenſion of thoſe that are confeſſedly true.*

Many of the Scholaſtick terms of Art and Diſtinction I have diſcarded: For indeed they are but the huſks of Science and ought to be pared off, if there is danger of their giving diſreliſh to the fruit itſelf. At the ſame time I have retained the meaning of ſeveral of them; ſo that they, who are deſirous of an acquaintance with them, may by comparing theſe chapters with the parallel ones of ſome Latin Compendium perhaps be better enabled to underſtand their ſignification. — And it muſt be confeſſed that ſuch acquaintance is very uſeful to thoſe, whoſe ſtudies are likely to carry them into the reading of philoſophical treatiſes and moral diſcourſes; where it is very common to find modes of ſpeech evidently borrowed from the Language of the Schools.

As the reaſon of my undertaking this Compendium was to remedy ſome of the inconveniencies which I ſeem'd to obſerve in thoſe already publiſhed; ſo I choſe to do it in Engliſh, *upon this principle, that the Rudiments of any Art or Science ought to be render'd as eaſy and familiar as poſſible. I ſuppoſe that the cuſtom of giving young beginners their Introduction to Philoſophy in the Latin tongue has been continued more out of neceſſity, more out of want of proper books in* Engliſh,

gliſh, *than from the deſign of preſerving or improving their ſkill in* Latin; *which purpoſe All muſt agree is beſt anſwered by Claſſical writers. And therefore I ſhould think it adviſeable for thoſe, who have not confirmed their taſte in elegant writing, to cultivate only an occaſional acquaintance with ſuch authors among the moderns as have delivered their philoſophical ſentiments in* Latin, *namely, to ſupply themſelves with proper Definitions and Diſtinctions to be uſed in their Diſputations. — Or, if their improvement in* Latin *is thought requiſite to be carried on jointly with that of Philoſophical Knowledge, the Reader will do well to view in* Tully's *Offices his elegant and maſterly draught of moſt of the ſocial or civil virtues. — Nor would even* Ariſtotle's *account of theſe matters, if taken immediately from himſelf, fail to bring with it a ſufficient degree of entertainment and improvement to the young Student. — This he will do as a* Scholar. *— But as a* Moral Agent (*i. e. as a perſon ſincerely deſirous to ſecure his main happineſs*) *it will be requiſite for him to examine what the Holy Scripture has declared upon each article: and for this purpoſe it may be adviſeable for him as he goes along to turn to the parallel heads in Biſhop* Gaſtrel's *Chriſtian Inſtitutes; a book which, I ſuppoſe, is, or which at leaſt deſerves be in every one's hand.*

At the end, I have ſubjoined two Tables. The Firſt *is a reference to ſuch Engliſh Diſcourſes or Sermons upon moral ſubjects, as have fallen within my notice ſince the taking of this task in hand. For I doubt not but that well diſpoſed per-*

ſons

ſons would now and then be glad to aſſiſt their meditations upon moral ſubjects, if they knew where ſuch aſſiſtance might be met with: and I have cited a greater variety of Authors than perhaps was neceſſary, that the Reader might have the better chance of being able to furniſh himſelf with a diſcourſe upon the ſubject required.

The Second Table is of ſeveral of the principal Writers in Moral Philoſophy. They are named in ſuch order as to give a little ſketch of the Hiſtory of this branch of Science.

AN INTRODUCTION TO *Moral Philoſophy.*

CHAP. I.

THE word *Philoſophy* is a general name comprehending all the Liberal Arts and Sciences. Some of theſe are *inſtrumental*, and deſigned only to facilitate our entrance upon the more valuable and important branches of knowledge, ſuch as *Grammar*, *Logick*, &c. Of the *principal* branches ſome are of a *ſpeculative* nature, as *Metaphyſicks*, *Natural Philoſophy*, *Mathematicks*, &c. or, if any parts of theſe are ſometimes called *practical*, this is only as they are applied to render us more *skilful* in certain *Operations*. Another branch of Philoſophy is term'd *practical* in a more proper ſenſe, as it has a direct reference to Human *Actions*, points out our duty, and regulates our conduct, that we may become *better* Men.

Philoſophy.

inſtrumental.

principal.

ſpeculative.

manual.

practical.

regulating.

Our Duty whence learnt. The nature of our Duty with the reaſon of its obligation may in ordinary caſes be learnt from conſidering the nature of man, and the circumſtances in which he is placed.

Some duties there are, to the performance of which All men, as far as they have opportunity or ability, are equally obliged; and *Ethicks.* theſe are the proper object of *Ethicks* or Moral Philoſophy.

Others reſult from the relation, which a man bears to a Civil Society, whether as Sovereign, Magiſtrate or Subject, and are conſidered in a diſtinct Science called *Politicks.* *Politicks.*

Add a third ſort concern a man no further than as he is either at the head, or is a part of a particular Family; and are treated of in *Oeconomicks.* *Oeconomicks.*

Politicks and Oeconomicks how commonly underſtood. It ought to be obſerved, that tho' the words *Politicks* and *Oeconomicks* are uſually underſtood to relate to ſuch rules or maxims of prudential conduct as have a tendency to promote the temporal proſperity of *Civil Communities* and *Families*, (in which view they make no part of Moral Philoſophy) yet the reciprocal duties of Sovereign and Subject, Maſter and Servant, Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, and of Kinſmen towards each other in their ſeveral degrees, are all of them parts, and very material ones too, of our Moral Conduct.

duct. The performance or neglect of them renders us proper objects of praiſe or diſpraiſe; the happineſs of life is greatly intereſted in the due obſervance of them, and their obligation might be deduced from the nature of man and his circumſtances in theſe relations of life; and therefore in a compleat ſyſtem of Ethicks they ought to be treated of diſtinctly. However, at the preſent I ſhall confine my ſelf to the general plan upon which obſervations concerning this ſubject have commonly been methodiſed.

In what Senſe they belong to Morality.

CHAP. II.

ETHICKS have uſually been defined the *Art of living well*, or, of living virtuouſly, and that, in order to become happy. Whoever reflects upon the conduct of himſelf or other men muſt obſerve, that, whatever action he deliberately performs or attempts, is done in proſpect of ſome *End*, ſome pleaſure or ſatisfaction, whether real or imaginary, near or remote, great or ſmall. Nothing can ſet us at work but the proſpect of ſome end to be attain'd thereby, ſomething that is ſuppoſed likely to better our condition, or to render our continuance in it more eaſy and pleaſant. That which tends to preſerve to us the continuance of our Being or

Ethicks.

All deliberate actions are perform'd in view of ſome end.

to

Good, Evil.

Good the general object of purſuit.

Evil of averſion.

Theſe of different kinds.

-proper to vegetables

-animals.

-men.

The foregoing all truly good, but ſubordinate to each other.

to render it more comfortable and delightful, is called *Good*; *Evil* the contrary. Hence Good is defined to be the general object of Deſire, Evil of Averſion. And the various and contrary choices that men make in the world do not argue that they do not all purſue Good; but that the ſame thing is not Good to every man alike, or does not appear ſo. In ſome men the ſeeds of virtue and goodneſs are almoſt ſuffocated by their concern for the preſervation of the vegetable part of them: if they receive their nutriment, are ſecured from the injuries of the ſeaſons, grow up to a ſtate of maturity, and propagate their kind, they trouble themſelves no further: Others are raiſed to the purſuit of ſomething beyond, and lay in their claim to the enjoyment of ſuch things as are grateful to their appetites and ſenſes: and laſtly, Others actuated by a ſenſe of dignity in their natures, ſeek their Good and find ſatisfaction in the exerciſe of piety, temperance, juſtice and charity. The firſt is the Good of a *Vegetable*, the ſecond of an *Animal*, the laſt of a *Moral Agent*.

As man partakes of a vegetable and animal nature, ſo doubtleſs whatever is Good to a vegetable or animal muſt be ſo to him: But on the other hand, as he is partaker of a nature altogether different in kind, more

noble

noble, and more properly the *self* within us that has a perception of Good or Evil, hither ought our regards principally to be directed. It is a duty that we owe our selves to endeavour to advance the welfare of all that makes part of our selves; But for the same reason it is wrong to misplace our main concern upon that in which our main interest cannot be conceived to lie. If the Rational part of us be really the more noble and interesting, hither ought we to bend our endeavours: the highest improvement and most perfect exertion of This ought to be regarded as our *summum Bonum*, our ultimate End; and every other excellency or advantage should be desired and pursued only in subordination to this, as *Means* to an *End*, as an Instrument put into our hands by the Author of our Nature in order to work out our real and best Happiness.

Summum Bonum. *Ultimate End.*

Means.

Although it appears from the history of Mankind, that an infinite number of objects have been pointed out to the view and pursued under this notion; and though it should be granted that there is no perfect satisfaction to be found in this life, this ought not to be admitted as an argument that there is in reality no object commensurate to our desires and expectations; It only proves that the

Whether there be an ultimate end to man.

Different pursuits of different men no objection.

the present state of things, however well adapted to give delight and pleasure to Vegetables and Animals as far as they are capable of receiving it, is not so with regard to the whole nature of Man.

Ultimate end of man not to be expected in this life.

Man is the only Being on earth that has any apprehension of a future State; he has a secret longing after it and a dread of annihilation; his circumstances in the world are such as might have been expected upon supposition that he was to be placed in a state of Tryal, as a Candidate for future happiness; he has Reason and Knowledge and Faculties superior to the business of this present world; and therefore we may reasonably admit these considerations as a strong presumption that he is really in a state of Tryal and Discipline, and that his Faculties have a respect to somewhat further and beyond this world. Nor can any shadow of a reason be assigned, why Almighty God, who at first gave us our Being, who has shed forth in such variety the influence of his Goodness, why, I say, He may not answer these reasonable expectations, the hopes and fears of his Creatures, and reward or punish them according as they have employed the time, which he has allotted them in this life, and the means of bettering themselves and their condition, with which he has furnished them.

Probable arguments of a future state.

The

The attention of mankind, where Religion is out of the case, is chiefly directed, either *first*, towards procuring a sufficiency of possessions for the answering their necessities; or *secondly*, towards the delight and satisfaction to be received in certain enjoyments, by their use and suitableness; or *thirdly*, towards the esteem of good men, whereby they are render'd acceptable and useful to others; which esteem must be understood to include the esteem and approbation of our own minds, in a sense of decency and dignity and moral improvement.

Divisions of Good into

These considerations have given rise to one of the divisions of *Good*, into *Profit*, *Pleasure*, and *Honour*. Another is often made use of with reference to the *Mind*, *Body*, and *Fortune*: Of the first kind are *good parts*, *strength of memory*, *wisdom*, *contentment*, &c. of the second, *soundness of constitution*, *health*, *beauty*, &c. of the last, *riches*, *liberty*, *honour*, &c.

Profit, Pleasure, Honour.

Goods of Mind,

Body,

Fortune.

I need barely mention that the "lessening "or escaping of Evil is to be reckon'd under "the notion of Good, and *vice versâ*.

Axioms concerning Good and Evil in general.

"The greater Good is to be preferr'd be- "fore the less, and the lesser Evil to be en- "dured rather than the greater.

"A pre-

"A preſent Good may be parted with, up-
"on a probable expectation of a future Good
"which is more excellent.

"A preſent Evil is to be endured for the
"avoiding of a probable future Evil which is
"far greater—and in both theſe caſes in pro-
"portion to the greatneſs of the Evil to be
"avoided, or Good to be obtained.

CHAP. III.

Parts of Human Nature.

HUMAN Nature is not one ſimple uni-form thing, but a compoſition of va-rious parts, with their ſeveral faculties, appe-tites, affections and paſſions.

The cloſe union between them.

The two principal parts of it are the *Soul* and *Body*. Altho' theſe two are entirely diffe-rent from each other in their natures, yet their union is inconceivably cloſe and intimate; they mutually affect each other; and (what-ever be the caſe of ſeparate ſpirits) in our preſent ſtate the Body is a neceſſary inſtru-ment of perception to the Soul.

Faculties of the Soul, Underſtan-ding,

The principal faculties of the Soul are the *Underſtanding* and the *Will*. The *Underſtan-ding* is that faculty or power, whereby we perceive ideas or notions in our minds and the agreement or diſagreement that is between them: Hereby we are capable of reflecting upon the natural conſtitution of things, and

of foreſeeing the good or bad conſequences of our behaviour. The *Will* is that Power, which the Soul hath within itſelf arbitrarily to begin or forbear, to continue or end ſeveral of its own actions, and motions of the Body. *Will.*

Whatever action is deliberately enter'd upon, whatever end we purſue, we may generally be able to diſtinguiſh in it ſeveral acts of the Underſtanding, and the Will, exerted in the following order. *What ſeveral acts of the Underſtanding & Will are diſtinguiſhable in the proſecution of Good. Their order.*

The Underſtanding furniſhes us with the notice of the *End*, which we propoſe to ourſelves: It likewiſe informs us whether or *how far* it ſeems likely to be advantageous or prejudicial to us. 1 Judicium abſolutum.

Now every proſpect of advantage naturally raiſeth in the mind a ſecret *Deſire* or inclination, which hath been called *Velleity*; Not that our Deſire is always proportioned to the known value of things. For if we ſee that it does not belong to our condition of Being, or lie within the ſphere of our attainment, we ſuſpend our deſire after it, and reſt ſatisfied without it. But if, upon farther deliberation, the advantage appears not only to be conſiderable in it ſelf, but alſo likely to be obtained, the Will upon ſuch repreſentation of the Underſtanding can ſcarce fail of giving 2 Velleitas. 3 Judicium comparatum.

4 Volitio. it the *actual preference* of a complete choice, which hath been called *Volition*. (The ſame is the caſe of a leſſer evil, when it appears neceſſary in order to avoid a greater.)

Upon this determination of the Will towards any particular object, the Underſtanding is exerted in order to *diſcover* the *Means* requiſite to obtain it, and out of ſeveral which offer themſelves, to *ſelect* the more proper.

5 Deliberatio.

6 Electio.

But ſtill it depends upon the Will what *uſe* to make of thoſe Means, which are *approved* of by the Underſtanding; as indeed it alſo doth, what degree of attention to beſtow upon the conſideration either of the End it ſelf, or the Means requiſite to obtain it.

7 Conſenſus.

8 Uſus.

To the Will likewiſe is uſually aſcribed the pleaſure and ſatisfaction taken in the *enjoyment* of any End acquired.

9 Fruitio.

Whether the Will be free.

Without entring into any of the intricate diſputes which have been ſtarted concerning the freedom of the human Will, thus much is certain; In moſt caſes we are not at liberty to forbear the act of Deſire, (or *Velleity*:) but in actual and *determined Chooſing*, (or *Volition*,) eſpecially where the Good is at all remote, we are. Here we may ſuſpend the act of our choice from being determined for or againſt the thing propoſed, 'till we have examined whether it be really of a nature in it

Libertas contrarietatis, ſeu ſpecificationis. Lib. contradictionis, ſeu exercitii.

ſelf and in its conſequences likely to make us happy or no. The Will is indeed always determined by that which upon the final reſult of conſideration is judged Good by the Underſtanding; but if by too haſty a choice of our own making we have impoſed upon our ſelves wrong meaſures of Good and Evil, the miſcarriages, which follow on it, muſt be imputed to our own Election: And indeed for this reaſon Freedom was given us that we might examine and take care of our own Happineſs, and look that we be not deceived.

Judicium ultimum intellectûs practici.

Why we were made Free-Agents.

CHAP. IV.

THE *Human Body* is ſo conſtituted as to receive impreſſions upon it from external objects. Theſe impreſſions are made according to thoſe ſeveral ways in which objects affect us, and that, whether we will or no: It being not in our power in many caſes *whether* we will receive them or no, or in *what manner* we will receive them: thus light and colours affect us by the *Eyes*; ſound by the *Ears*; taſtes by the *Palate*; ſmells by the *Noſe*; heat and cold, hardneſs and ſoftneſs, &c. by the *Touch*. Senſation is that perception of the Soul, which actually accompanies ſuch impreſſions; and if either the organs of Senſe, or the nerves, which are the immediate

External ſenſations.

We are paſſive in them.

Five Senſes.

The ſenſes are only inſtruments of perception,

but neceſſary ones.

mediate inſtruments whereby the Soul is affected, are any of them ſo diſordered, as not to perform their functions, the objects have no way to bring themſelves into view, and be perceived by the Underſtanding.

Moreover, there is another ſort of Perceptions to be taken notice of, whereby the Mind reflects upon what paſſes within itſelf, and upon other things; ſome whereof do not fall within the reach of, and others do not actually affect our bodily ſenſes; and which are called *internal* ſenſations. Of the former kind is the ſenſe we have of actions or perſons under the notion of virtuous or vicious, honourable or baſe; &c. of the latter, our apprehenſion of danger from an impending evil &c.

Internal ſenſations.

Our ſenſitive faculties, *internal* as well as *external*, are fitted by the infinitely wiſe Contriver of our Being to our ſtate and condition in the world: By them we are able to know and diſtinguiſh things ſo far, as to apply them to our uſes, and to regulate the conduct of Ourſelves. But in order to prompt us effectually to exert our active powers, both of Mind and Body, for thoſe purpoſes, GOD has implanted in us certain inward Feelings, a variety of Appetites, Affections and Paſſions, which ſerve as ſo many ſprings of action

Fitted to our ſtate.

ction, both putting us upon, and helping to carry us thro', a courſe of behaviour ſuitable to our condition.

Ideas of the Paſſions whence form'd.

The ideas of our Appetites, Affections and Paſſions are beſt formed by reflecting on what we feel within our ſelves; where we ſhall find that ſeveral of our Senſations are accompanied with pleaſant or painful commotions of our nature, from the various operations of Good or Evil, as they are differently applied to, or conſidered by us.

Senſations generally attended with pleaſure and pain.

Though theſe perceptions are daily felt and ſpoken of, yet it is not always eaſy in words to aſcertain what their ideas are, or to diſtinguiſh them from each other, and much leſs to explain, or to account for, thoſe ſurprizing commotions of our nature, which ſuch perceptions produce in us; from whence it comes to paſs that treatiſes concerning them ſeldom ſtand clear of the charge of abſtruſeneſs. The word *Appetite* ſeems properly to denote a tendency towards ſome bodily gratification; thus the Appetite of *Hunger* operates inſenſibly upon us to uſe the recruits of food as the neceſſary means of our preſervation: It is uſed figuratively, when we ſpeak of a longing after fame, a thirſt for glory. *Affection* is a general word applicable both to *Appetites*, and thoſe other commotions

Appetites.

Affections.

Paſſions. motions of our Nature which are called *Paſſions*, eſpecially the milder ſort of them. It is alſo uſed for thoſe active principles within us, *Inſtincts.* which are ſometimes called *Inſtincts*, ſuch as the natural tenderneſs of Parents towards their Offspring.

The Paſſions moſt uſually taken notice of are the following,

Love, *Love* is a propenſion of the mind towards any thing, abſent or preſent, ariſing from the Delight, which it is apt to produce in us.

Hatred, *Hatred* is an averſion to any thing, abſent or preſent, ariſing from the thought of the Pain or Diſguſt, which it is apt to produce in us.

Deſire, *Deſire* is the uneaſineſs a Man finds in himſelf upon the Abſence of any thing, whoſe preſent enjoyment carries the idea of Delight with it.

Joy, *Joy* is a Delight of the Soul, from the conſideration of the Preſent, or, aſſured approaching poſſeſſion of any Good.

Sorrow, *Sorrow* is an uneaſineſs in the Soul upon the thought of a Good Loſt, which might have been enjoyed longer; or, the ſenſe of a Preſent Evil.

Hope, *Hope* is the pleaſure of the Soul upon the proſpect of a Probable enjoyment of any thing which is apt to delight us.

Fear

Fear is an uneaſineſs of the Soul upon the Apprehenſion of a Future Evil likely to befall us. *Fear,*

Deſpair is that uneaſineſs of the Soul, which ariſes from the thought of the Unattainableneſs of any Good. *Deſpair,*

Anger is a commotion and diſcompoſure of the Soul upon the receipt of any injury, with a preſent purpoſe of making the aggreſſor ſenſible of our Reſentment. *Anger.*

Beſides the foregoing there are many more; ſome of which will be touch'd upon when I mention the particular Virtues. And they are ſcarce any of them in life and practice ſimple and alone and wholly unmixed with others: tho' in diſcourſe and converſation that uſually carries the name which appears moſt in the preſent ſtate of the Mind. *Number of the paſſions not eaſily aſcertained. Some ſimple, others mixed.*

It is obſervable that our paſſions, moſt of them, in moſt perſons, operate ſtrongly on the Body, and cauſe various changes in it; thus, Shame is apt to cauſe bluſhing; Anger and Fear, paleneſs and trembling; Sorrow, tears. *Paſſions affect the body as well as mind.*

The Paſſions are of admirable uſe in life and tend many times to noble ends. Our inward frame, of which they make a conſiderable part, does in a particular manner anſwer to the external condition and circumſtances of life in which we are placed; and will afford, *Paſſions very uſeful, and even neceſſary to our preſent condition.*

ford, to ſuch as will but be attentive, certain inſtances of a final cauſe: They lead us to a determinate courſe of action ſuitable to our condition; they ſhew us what courſe of life we are deſigned for, and what is our duty, and in a peculiar manner enforce upon us the practice of it. The Paſſions therefore are not to be conſidered as mere infirmities. They *primarily* and moſt *directly* lead to a right behaviour. Some of them are of that nature that without them we could not well ſubſiſt, being placed within us as guards and a ſecurity to our intereſts: Others of them ſeem intended to quicken our ſearch after the neceſſaries and conveniences of living, for which meer Reaſon would ſcarce make a due proviſion. If pleaſure were wholly ſeparated from all outward ſenſations and inward thoughts, we ſhould have no reaſon to prefer one thought or motion before another, negligence to attention, or motion to reſt; and ſo, we ſhould neither move our bodies, nor employ our minds.

Iraſcible,

Concupiſcible,

It muſt be confeſſed however, that *ſecondarily* and *more remotely* they lead us into what is evil; and that they are ſo very apt to grow upon us, eſpecially with regard to objects of ſenſe, if they are not kept under exact diſcipline, that they ought to be watched and well

Paſſions neceſſary to be kept under, why?

well examined. If Reaſon is on their ſide, or ſtands neuter, they *may* be heard: In other caſes we *muſt* be deaf to their applications, and ſtrongly guard againſt their emotions. In this view the occaſional denial of ſuch inclinations as in themſelves are lawful, may be found expedient, in order to keep temptations at a proper diſtance; it may be of great uſe in curing our defects or at leaſt in preventing the ill conſequences of them.

Self-denial why uſeful?

We ſhall rightly qualify the exerciſe of our Paſſions, and the natural expreſſions of them, by taking care, 1. that they be not diſproportionate to the *occaſion*, or *object*.

Exerciſe of our Paſſions how to be qualified.

2. — not unfitting for the *manner*, or *ſeaſon*.

3. — not immoderate in the *degree*.

Hence appears the reaſon why ſome Paſſions are ſpoken of as vicious and immoral in their very nature; namely, becauſe ſome of them taken with their ſpecial objects and degrees have obtained peculiar names, ſuch as *Pride*, *Envy*, *Revenge*, &c. all which words import ſomething irregular in both thoſe reſpects. And ſo on the other hand, the ſame words, which ſignify ſome Paſſions, ſignify likewiſe the virtues which are to regulate them, ſuch as *Compaſſion*, *Goodwill*; which are therefore ſaid to be virtuous paſſions.

Why ſome Paſſions are ſaid to be vicious in their very nature, others virtuous.

Difference between Self-love and particular Affections.

In conſidering our Paſſions we ſhould diſtinguiſh between that *general* deſire of our own happineſs, which is found in every man and is properly Self-love, and our various *particular* affections paſſions and appetites to particular things. The object of the former is ſomewhat *internal*, our own happineſs, enjoyment and ſatisfaction, whether we have or have not a diſtinct particular perception what it is or wherein it conſiſts: The object of the latter is this or that particular *external* thing, which the affections tend towards, and of which we have always a particular idea or perception: thus, riches are the object of avarice; honour of ambition, &c. Self-love never ſeeks any thing external for the ſake of the thing, but only as a means of happineſs or Good: Particular affections reſt in the external things themſelves. And thus, Virtue may be ſaid to be deſireable *upon its own account*, we having within us undeniably an affection towards and an approbation of Virtue as eligible in and for it ſelf, as we alſo have a general abhorrence of what is baſe and vicious: It may be ſaid likewiſe to be *its own reward*; becauſe every virtuous purſuit, for inſtance, every endeavour to do Good to others, whether it ſucceeds or no, is gratified by its own conſciouſneſs, and brings with it immediate pleaſure and ſatisfaction. It

Object of the former internal,

of the latter external.

It ſhould be further obſerved, that as Man may be conſidered in two capacities, the *Private* and *Social*, as being deſigned not only to purſue his own intereſt, but likewiſe to contribute to the good of others, ſo, ſome of our affections in their primary intention and deſign ſeem to belong to the ſingle or private, others to the publick or ſocial capacity, and are directed in particular courſes by ſeveral regards to Family, Friends, Neighbourhood, the Diſtreſſed, our Country: thus, Men often ſympathize in the happineſs and afflictions of Others; they have undoubtedly a reſentment of tyranny, injuſtice, oppreſſion, in behalf of Others, as well as of Themſelves. The Affections relating hereunto are called by the general name *Humanity*; becauſe they peculiarly become the condition in which we are placed, that of a natural and neceſſary dependance upon each other. Between the private and ſocial Affections there is really no contrariety, but they perfectly coincide and mutually carry on each other: The greateſt ſatisfaction to Ourſelves depends upon our having the latter in a due degree; and the former is one chief ſecurity of our right behaviour towards Society: And their mutual coinciding, ſo that we can ſcarce promote the one without the other, is equally a proof, that

Affections, ſome private, others ſocial.

Theſe latter called Humanity. *Why?*

Private & ſocial Affections not inconſiſtent with each other. Both of 'em inſtrumental to the general happineſs of Mankind.

that we were made for both. That ſeeming competition, which appears ſometimes to lie between Benevolence and Private intereſt, relates not ſo much to the enjoyment it ſelf, as to the materials and means of enjoyment, which the moſt abandoned would chuſe to obtain by innocent methods, if they were as eaſy and effectual to their End. Men follow and obey their Nature in both theſe reſpects, in a certain degree, but not entirely: As they neglect the duties which they owe their fellow creatures, to which their Nature leads them, and contrary to the dictates of Nature ſhew themſelves unjuſt, oppreſſive, treacherous and ungrateful, in order to gratify more effectually their eager deſire after equality and ſuperiority, or ſuch and ſuch external goods; ſo, there is in ſome men a manifeſt negligence of their own real happineſs and intereſt in the preſent world, when that intereſt is inconſiſtent with a preſent gratification; for the ſake of which they negligently, nay even knowingly, become the authors and inſtruments of their own ruin.

In what reſpect they interfere.

Men act no leſs in contradiction to their Private, than Social happineſs.

CHAP. V.

Human actions what?

WHEN we ſpeak of *Human Actions* (under which word is comprehended the *forbearance* of any action) we mean ſuch as flow

flow directly from the principles which diſtinguiſh Man from Brute, namely, thoſe belonging to our Rational part, our *Underſtanding* and *Will*. When any Action is performed in conſequence of the order and command of the Mind it is ſaid to be *voluntary*, and becomes *imputable* to a Man, that is, placed to his account as the proper Author of it. Now the Mind cannot be properly ſaid to order and command an action, unleſs it both perceives the nature of it, and unleſs the doing or not doing of it depends upon the determination of the Mind. The action of a tennis-ball by the ſtroke of the racket is involuntary with regard to the ball, which has neither the power of perception or volition; but it is voluntary with reſpect to the ſtriker, who has *both*. The action of a man ſtriking himſelf or his friend by a convulſive motion of his arm is likewiſe involuntary, for want of the *latter*.

when voluntary,

imputable.

when involuntary.

Actions are conſidered as *voluntary*, and (which is a conſequence thereof) liable to puniſhment and cenſure, tho' the preference given by the mind does not immediately regard the actions themſelves, but ſomething that has a direct tendency to produce them: thus, men are blamed for having brought diſeaſes upon themſelves, tho' their Will has been

Actions voluntary mediately *or* immediately.

been exerciſed only with regard to the true *cauſe* of the diſeaſe, viz. intemperate eating and drinking.

Neceſſary Agent. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition, are in every thing *neceſſary* Agents, that is, in a moral view no Agents at all; they are no ſubjects of Morality.

Mixt Actions. There is ſcarce any action of importance, which men perform, but what is attended with a mixture of good and evil, pleaſure and pain. No man deſires evil or pain for its own ſake, and therefore ſo far the action becomes *involuntary:* But in order to ſecure a more valuable good, or to avoid a greater future evil or pain, men part with a preſent good, and ſubmit to a preſent evil with the utmoſt readineſs; thus, men every day undergo ſevere operations in chirurgery; they value not the pains of the body ariſing from want, diſeaſe, or outward injuries, in proſpect of that happineſs, which virtue, piety and religion lead unto.

Actions perform'd thro' ignorance how far Voluntary. Where there is no perception there can properly ſpeaking be no preference: and conſequently ſuch actions as are performed thro' mere ignorance are in themſelves involuntary. But then it ſhould be remember'd, that ignorance is ſometimes owing to an abuſe of our natural faculties; ſometimes to negligence and inat-

inattention in not duly conſidering things in their nature and conſequences: Both which kinds of miſconduct make us anſwerable for the miſcarriages which follow: thus, anger and drunkenneſs ſo far cloud and diſorder the Underſtanding, as to hurry men on to murder &c. contrary to the judgment of their cooler thoughts; but inaſmuch as a proper degree of care might have ſtifled, or at leaſt controlled the one and prevented the other, the murderer is juſtly ſubjected to puniſhment as a *voluntary* Agent.

Ignorance ſometimes reſpects the *Rule* of Action, ſometimes the *Action* itſelf and its circumſtances; which being in ſome caſes very numerous and perplexing, errors in judgment ariſing from thence are frequently excuſed. *Ignorantia Juris, Facti.*

Ignorance of *Law*, or of the *Rule* of Action, is rarely, if ever, admitted as an excuſe: for the *general rules* of morality lie ſo obvious to the human underſtanding, that nothing but a very criminal neglect or indolence can prevent their being perceived: And as for *particular* laws, every wiſe legiſlator hath proper methods of promulging them and bringing them within the ſubject's notice; after which it is at their own peril if they continue ignorant. *Ignorance of Law why not admitted as an excuſe?*

In

Vincible ignorance,

In either caſe, if the ignorance be *vincible*, i. e. if it be owing to our not making a proper uſe of thoſe means of knowing better wherewith the providence of God hath furniſhed us, it becomes criminal and puniſhable; and that in proportion to the dignity and importance of the matter, which ought to have engaged our attentive conſideration.

Invincible ignorance.

Invincible ignorance, or that which it was not in our power to have avoided, will no doubt be admitted as an excuſe by every juſt Judge: No commands whether Human or Divine, however general, can be ſuppoſed to extend to ſuch perſons, as are under a natural incapacity of obeying them: And we alſo humbly hope that a merciful allowance will be made for ſuch ignorances, as may ariſe either from the infirmity of our nature, or from the diſadvantageous circumſtances of life in which we are placed, and not from preſumptuous careleſneſs and inattention.

abſolutely ſo,

morally ſo.

Habits what:

I muſt not conclude this chapter without obſerving, as matter of certain experience and of great importance, that by voluntary actions, eſpecially if often repeated, we get an aptneſs, a facility, readineſs and often a pleaſure in them, before we are aware. Our Nature is formed to yield to uſe and exerciſe: thereby the inclinations which render'd

how formed.

us

us averſe to a courſe of action grow weaker; the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary, but the real ones, leſſen; the reaſons for it offer themſelves of courſe to our thoughts on all occaſions; and the contrary principles, by being accuſtomed to ſubmit, come at length to do ſo of courſe: And thus by repeated acts, and momentary impreſſions frequently made upon us, ſettled alterations in our tempers and characters are introduced imperceptibly; and *Habits* are formed, which, when confirmed, grow as it were into a ſecond Nature. Thus, ſeveral *bodily* activities and motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, are owing to Uſe: ſo again, as to the *Mind*, general habits of life and conduct, ſuch as thoſe of obedience and ſubmiſſion to authority; thoſe of veracity, temperance, juſtice and charity; thoſe of attention and induſtry, are produced by Exerciſe and Diſcipline, as their contraries are likewiſe by acts of Indulgence and Licentiouſneſs. We do not know indeed how far it is *poſſible* in the nature of things, that effects ſhould be wrought in us at once, equivalent to what is produced by uſe and exerciſe; but by the appointment of Providence, in ordinary caſes at leaſt, this latter is the way of forming within our ſelves Habits of action.

Habits how formed.

CHAP. VI.

Morality of Actions ſuppoſes ſome Rule.

THE *Morality* of mens voluntary actions implies a relation to ſome rule, whereby their rectitude or obliquity is examined; the former rendring them a proper ſubject of praiſe and reward, the latter of cenſure and puniſhment.

What that Rule is.

Right Reaſon is generally ſaid to be the rule by which we are to examine moral actions, and try their goodneſs; and according to their conformity or non-conformity to it, they receive the name of *Good* or *Evil.*

Divine Actions, whether ſubject to Rule.

We know ſo little of the ſcheme of GOD's government either natural or moral, that it muſt be preſumption in us to ſay, why Almighty GOD choſe to form the Univerſe as He has done, or to order the preſent courſe of his Providence. Some intrinſick Excellence there muſt have been in the nature of the Scheme itſelf, which determined the divine Will, juſt as ſpeculative truth determines the aſſent of an intelligent Being: A fitneſs alſo there doubtleſs is in the ſeveral parts of that Scheme (i. e. the Means made uſe of by GOD are very fit and proper to anſwer the Divine end and intention:) And, as this Fitneſs is fully known to Him, and He has no ſuperiour, it may be called the unalterable Rule

Natural fitneſs in what ſenſe their rule.

of

of the Divine conduct — with as much propriety, as any ſuch term can be applied to a Being, who tranſcends our largeſt conceptions; and concerning whoſe conduct it is but a decent piece of prudence to ſpeak and reaſon with the utmoſt caution and reverence.

Will of God the rule of human actions, Why?

But with regard to *Man*, his adequate rule of action is the Will of GOD, howſoever made known: The very condition of our nature ſubjects our conduct to a ſtrict conformity to His direction, nor is it poſſible for us to diſengage our ſelves from the Obligation to follow it.

Law of Nature what?

In ordinary caſes the apparent fitneſs of things, as manifeſted by the light of natural reaſon, is a preſumptive proof, the beſt and only proof which we have, that this or that courſe of Action is agreeable to the Divine Will. This is called the *Law of Nature*.

Law of Revelation to be attended to.

But ſuppoſing GOD to have ſufficiently notified to mankind any external revelation of His Will, — this muſt raiſe in every ſerious mind a ſenſe of duty and ſecurity in following it; and of ſin and danger in deviating from it. We are imperfect Beings, we can not always ſuppoſe ourſelves competent judges of what is right; and therefore upon the principle of common prudence it would be fit and reaſonable to take infinite Goodneſs

Why?

and

and Wiſdom for our Guide: But when we add to this, that We are dependent Creatures,—that God, in virtue of His being our Creator and Preſerver has a Right to our Obedience, it can not but appear to be right reaſon, in the higheſt and ſtricteſt ſenſe, for Man to conform his actions to the Will of God, howſoever made known; neither can We, in point of intereſt or gratitude, depart from it without being ſelf-condemned.

Conſcience what?

The human Underſtanding as it is particularly exèrciſed in the examination of an action by its proper rule is termed *Conſcience:* In which exerciſe are implied three parts; *firſt*, the knowledge of the rule; *ſecondly*, the application of the action to it; *thirdly*, the judgment of the underſtanding pronounced concerning its agreement or diſagreement.

Its ſeveral Acts.

Theſe ſeveral acts are in many caſes performed with ſo much quickneſs, that the interval between them is ſcarce diſcernable; juſt as the mind by a ſingle glance at once apprehends a viſible object, judges of its magnitude, and approves its beauty and proportion with an involuntary readineſs. Hence this faculty is ſometimes called *Moral Senſe*; and occaſion has been taken to ſpeak of moral ſubjects in a language directly borrowed from ſenſible things, ſuch as is imported in the words *Beauty, Order, Harmony, Proportion.* Tho'

Moral Senſe.

Though it be a good general rule for a man always to perſiſt in acting according to the beſt of his judgment, yet, if due attention might have rectified that judgment, the error and miſconduct conſequent thereupon becomes juſtly imputable. *Erroneous Conſcience does not always excuſe, why not?*

If the caſe be very uncertain in itſelf, and we happen to be under no authoritative obligation to act, it will be ſafeſt to forbear, 'till the difficulty is removed: This, at leaſt in all ordinary caſes, is within our power. *What is to be done in caſes of difficulty.*

This faculty of Conſcience, we find, claims to it ſelf the adjuſtment and correction of all other inward ſentiments and affections, to allow or forbid their gratification: Nay, whether we conſult it or no, it magiſterially exerts it ſelf, and approves ſome actions, conſequent upon thoſe affections, as *right* and of good deſert, and condemns others, as *wrong* and of ill deſert; and goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual ſentence, which ſhall hereafter ſecond and confirm its own, and reward or puniſh us accordingly. (This uneaſineſs when felt in a great degree in matters of importance is called *Remorſe.*) Towards a third ſort it is affected neither of theſe ways, but is quite *indifferent.* *Authority of Conſcience.* *Remorſe.*

In

Actions considered as to their Subſtance, as to their Circumſtances.

In judging concerning the morality of actions, regard is to be had not meerly to the *Subſtance* of the action, the bare event or fact, but alſo, and principally, to the *Circumſtances* of it. Though the taking away the life or property of others is generally wrong, yet thoſe actions may be ſo circumſtantiated as to become lawful; as, when the life of a Criminal is taken away in virtue of the ſentence of a lawful Magiſtrate; or, when we ſecrete his ſword from a man under the tranſport of anger, &c. On the other hand, Actions, that in the general carry the appearance of being indifferent, ceaſe to be ſo by the concurrence of ſome particular circumſtances; thus, Nothing is more common than for men to be abridged in the uſe of their natural liberty by the authority of the civil Magiſtrate; Rites and Ceremonies, however indifferent in themſelves, ceaſe to be ſo, when enjoyned by lawful Authority.

Circumſtances are what chiefly determine the moral nature of Actions.

Enumeration of the ſeveral Circumſtances to be taken into our account.

The ſeveral conſiderations to be taken into account, when we eſtimate the moral good or evil of any action, are uſually recited in this order,

The *Perſon*, by whom; the *Object*, upon which; the *Place*, where; the *Means*, whereby; the *Motive*, or principle upon which; the *Manner*, in which; the *Time*, when the action is performed.

If

If an action be defective in any one of thoſe reſpects, it ceaſes to be morally good; not that all Crimes are equal; but the degree in which ſuch actions are morally evil is to be eſtimated not only from the number, but the importance, of thoſe particulars in which they are defective.

What is requiſite to render actions morally Good, or Evil?

Moral Virtue is uſually ſpoken of as conſiſting in a *Mean* between two Extremes: Thus, true courage is beſet with raſhneſs on the one ſide, and cowardice on the other.

Virtue conſiſts in Mediocrity.

It has been likewiſe obſerved that ſome Virtues are placed nearer, or bear more reſemblance to one of the extremes than the other, as courage does to raſhneſs. Hence Writers in Ethicks have been induc'd to borrow a diſtinction from Mathematicks, and apply it to Moral Virtue. Commutative Juſtice they make to conſiſt in the *Arithmetical Mean* (as 4 between 2 and 6); All other Virtues in the *Geometrical* (as 4 between 2 and 8). In both which caſes the proportion is real; but in the former, the diſtance of the *Mean* from each *Extreme* is equal; in the latter, unequal.

Why ſome Virtues are ſaid to conſiſt in Arithmetical, others in Geometrical mean?

And it muſt be confeſſed that as ſome men are apt to fail in not coming up to the line of Virtue, ſo others by falſe zeal, impetuoſity of temper &c. are found to overſhoot it.

What foundation for placing Virtue in Mediocrity?

But

But whether it be that with regard to ſome virtues it is not common to find inſtances both of the exceſs and defect, or that languages have failed in marking them out by peculiar names, we ſhall ſometimes be at a loſs to aſſign to every virtue two extremes.

Prudence why introduced among the Virtues.

In all caſes, as has been obſerved, the moral goodneſs of an action depends upon the *Circumſtances*, which attend the performance of it. How to judge of thoſe circumſtances is a matter of *Prudence*; and for that reaſon Moraliſts have introduced Prudence itſelf into the claſs of Virtues, as that which gives Being to all the reſt; calling it however by way of diſtinction an *Intellectual* Virtue.

an intellectual Virtue.

Common caſes of Morality very clear.

As in ſpeculative matters ſome propoſitions are ſo clear and evident, that the mind cannot refuſe its aſſent to their truth; ſo in morals, we may be juſtly ſaid to have a natural facnlty to diſtinguiſh between Good and Evil. In moſt common ordinary caſes of juſtice and charity, let any honeſt man, before he engages in a courſe of action, aſk himſelf, Is this I am going about, right or wrong? Is it good or is it evil? I doubt not but the queſtion would be anſwered agreeably to truth and virtue.

Firſt thoughts in ſuch caſes generally beſt.

In ſuch caſes to doubt and deliberate is diſhoneſty; It is often nothing but an endea-

vour

vour to explain our duty away: By refining and raiſing difficulties about circumſtances of bounds and degrees, men may, if they pleaſe, evade every moral obligation.

But yet care and diligence are requiſite in judging of Morality.

Not but that it is very poſſible for men either by prejudice, cuſtom, falſe honour &c. to impoſe upon themſelves wrong meaſures and ſtandards of what is right and wrong; or, for want of proper information, or due attention to the circumſtances of a particular caſe, to be miſtaken in their application of it to the true ſtandard. And therefore our Underſtanding ſtands in need of proper diligence in its cultivation no leſs with reſpect to Morality than other matters; and this intellectual virtue of Prudence, like other habits, is to be acquired by frequent exerciſe, by exact thinking and careful conſideration.

The true notion of Prudence,

However, let it be remembered, that *Prudence* is by no means the ſame with meer ſpeculative diſcernment of what ought to determine the actions of a wiſe man; It implies moreover a due concern that we are not miſtaken, the recollecting and putting our ſelves upon our guard againſt falſe appearances of reaſon and happineſs, and forming practical reſolutions to act ſuitably to our mature convictions. *Folly*, on the other hand, tho' it generally ariſes from a certain ſhallowneſs of

Folly.

Folly. understanding, is not meer incapacity to judge between right and wrong behaviour: But it is a thoughtleſs want of attention to what is reaſonable, and a diſſolute negligence in regulating our ſelves with a view to it; which, in a Being conſtituted as Man is, cannot fail of being immoral in a high degree; and indeed in our preſent ſtate it generally brings with it its own puniſhment, as might be inſtanc'd in the various miſeries of life and extreme diſtreſſes, which people might have avoided by proper care and attention.

CHAP. VII.

Virtue what. VIRTUE conſiſts in an habitual regard to what is reaſonable, right, and good in all our actions. It does not neceſſarily imply an actual accompliſhment thereof: But it is ſufficient, if we exert our beſt and ſincereſt endeavours (for inſtance) to accompliſh all the good we can, to All with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner which the different relations we ſtand in to them require. On the other hand, *Vice* conſiſts in doing what is unreaſonable, wrong or evil; — in intending to have done it, had it been in our power; — or, in neglecting to do what we ought.

Vice.

Virtue is ſometimes ſaid to conſiſt in following Nature: Vice in deviating from it. *viz.* The nature of man is plainly adapted to a certain courſe of action: Upon comparing actions with this nature, ſome appear unſuitable and diſproportionate, as, parricide; others ſuitable and correſpondent, as, filial piety. Is a man a Father? a view of the relation, which he bears to his children, will inform him that his proper virtue is to take care of, to educate, and make due proviſion for them. Is he a Governour? — to protect thoſe who are under his authority. Has he received favours? — to be grateful to his Benefactor. Has he favours to beſtow? he will ſhew himſelf more virtuous by beſtowing them upon the indigent, than upon thoſe who have no occaſion for his aſſiſtance, &c.

Virtue in what ſenſe following Nature.

What is requiſite to denominate any ſingle action good or virtuous has already been explained. Virtue, as above defined, is conſidered as applicable to the Perſon rather than his Action, thereby conſtituting what we call his Character. Now, inaſmuch as the exerciſe of good actions is generally attended with ſome temptation to the contrary, and conſequently with ſome difficulty to be overcome, the frequent performance of good actions is generally neceſſary to reconcile the affe-

Virtue of Actions, of Perſons.

Habit of Virtue how acquired.

affections, to form the heart and temper to a love and liking of what is good, and to secure us in the constant pursuit of it throughout the course of our behaviour. Nay, actions materially virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, being (I suppose) perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, may yet have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue within us, if the principle of virtue be at all exercised. But when the exercise of this principle is more continued, oftner repeated, and more intense, as it must be in circumstances of danger, temptation and difficulty of any kind, and in any degree, this tendency is increased proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the consequence.

Difficulties and Dangers productive of it.

Division of Virtue according to the Objects.

This Character may be considered in different views, and as exerted in different ways towards different objects: with regard to God we call it *Piety*; with regard to other men, *Probity*; with regard to a man's self, *Temperance*. To determine what is each man's particular duty, as such, and how the general rules of morality are to be applied in cases of some peculiar difficulty is the proper province of *Casuistry*.

Casuistry what?

Piety what?

Piety is the habit of behaving dutifully and reverently towards Almighty God. It comprehends

prehends all thoſe affections of mind, which are immediately due to GOD from ſuch a Creature as Man, and which reſt in Him as their end.

Tho' GOD be in himſelf one uniform Being, ſimply one and for ever the ſame, yet He is and muſt neceſſarily be the object of different affections to us Creatures, who cannot but conſider Him in partial and different views: and His ſeveral excellencies may be conſidered as objects of contemplation diſtinct from each other.

God tho' ſimple yet conceived by different Attributes.

- is the object of diſferent Affections.

Goodneſs we call the proper character of GOD, with wiſdom to direct it and power to exert it; fixt, ſteady, equally unmoved by weak pity, or more weak fury and reſentment; forming the juſteſt ſcheme of conduct; going on undiſturbed in the execution of it, thro' the ſeveral methods of ſeverity and reward, towards the general happineſs of his Creatures.

Natural idea of God.

Superior excellencies of any kind, particularly His power, wiſdom, juſtice, and his rightful Authority over us, eſpecially as our Reaſon evinces Him to be always intimately preſent with us, are the object of *Awe* and *Reverence*; His goodneſs already exerciſed towards us, our preſent dependence upon Him, and not only this, but our expectations of future

Awe and Reverence what Attributes they reſpect.

future benefits ought, and have a natural tendency, to raiſe in us the affections of *Affiance*, *Gratitude* and *Love* towards Him.

Love,

The imperfection of our virtue joyned with the conſideration of His abſolute Rectitude and Holineſs will ſcarce permit that perfection of Love which intirely caſts out all *Fear*, the Fear of His Diſpleaſure; yet the conſciouſneſs of a real endeavour to approve our ſelves to Him, joined with the conſideration of His goodneſs, as it excludes all ſervile dread and horror, ſo it is plainly a reaſonable ground for *Hope* of His favour. *Reſignation* to the Divine Will, and an eaſy acquieſcence in what He appoints, or thinks proper to permit in the world, is a temper of mind made up of the foregoing affections, and will neceſſarily be produced by our having juſt conceptions of GOD, and a due ſenſe of His Authority and Our ſtate of Dependence: and hence will naturally ariſe a conſtant *Attention* to obey His commands, and the higheſt *enjoyment* in the conſciouſneſs of His favour and approbation.

Fear,

Hope,

Reſignation,

Obedience,

Joy,

Devotion is the actual exerciſe of thoſe affections towards GOD, which are ſuppoſed habitual in good men. Hereby at proper ſeaſons we withdraw our ſelves from the avocations of ſenſe, and yield our ſelves up to the in-

Devotion what.

its exerciſe,

influence of the Divine Preſence, and give full ſcope to the affections of Gratitude, Love, Reverence, Truſt, and Dependence; we *pray* unto Him for the relief of our Wants, and *thankfully acknowledge* the Bleſſings we have already received. *its principal Acts.*

Wherever there is this *inward* Veneration of GOD, it will naturally exert and teſtify it ſelf to Others by an aweful reverence of his *Name*, his *Word* &c. and by ſuch *external* ſervices and actions, as by the conſent of mankind have been judged proper expreſſions thereof. And this will be accompanied with a hearty zeal and indignation againſt all ſuch things as reflect diſhonour upon Him. Indeed Divine Worſhip, as it is in it ſelf abſolutely due to GOD, ſo alſo it is neceſſary to a further end, — with regard to *Ourſelves* to keep alive upon our minds a ſenſe of his Authority, a ſenſe of acting in our ordinary behaviour under His inſpection, as our Governour and Judge; and alſo with regard to *Other men*, to raiſe and ſtrengthen in Them the ſame ſenſe of Piety and Virtue by our Example. *External exerciſe of Devotion.* *its neceſſity.*

The two oppoſites to Piety are *Prophaneneſs* and *Superſtition*. *Prophaneneſs* is the reverſe of what I have been deſcribing. *Superſtition* imports a frightful and over-timorous notion *Extremes of Piety, Prophaneneſs, Superſtition.*

notion of God; repreſenting Him as auſtere and rigorous, eaſily provoked by every little circumſtantial miſtake, and as eaſily appeaſed again by any flattering and ſlight formalities.

CHAP. VIII.

From conſidering the Conſtitution of Human nature we are led to know our Duty.

WE ſee ſufficient evidence in the very conſtitution of Man's nature to convince us, that he is not left to act at random: His nature is adapted to attain his own happineſs, and to promote that of others. And this is reaſon ſufficient to believe, that God, the Author of Nature, intended it for thoſe purpoſes. His Conſcience approves of and gives atteſtation to ſuch a courſe of Action as is agreeable thereto; and the beſt ſecurity of preſerving to Conſcience its full authority, and conſequently of perſevering in a courſe of Virtue, is to live under the habitual reverence of God.

Piety the beſt ſecurity of Moral Virtue,

neceſſary for that purpoſe. Why?

Whoever conſiders the whole commerce of Human Life will ſee that a great part of the intercourſe amongſt men cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules. Yet in moſt caſes there is certainly a right and a wrong; (for inſtance) a merciful, liberal, kind, and compaſſionate behaviour, which ſurely is our Duty; and an unmerciful, contracted ſpirit, an hard and oppreſſive courſe of action, which

is

is moſt certainly immoral and vicious. What written Law can here define ſo preciſely, wherein a contracted ſpirit and hard uſage of others doth conſiſt, that we ſhall ſay in all caſes where rigid right and juſtice end, and oppreſſion begins? It is certain therefore, that ſome ſuch ſuperior principle, as that of Piety, is requiſite to influence our moral conduct, and to prevent that prevarication, with which we might otherwiſe be led to impoſe upon our ſelves, and to elude the cenſure of others.

Juſtice conſiſts in the habitual inclination to give every one his Due. According to which account moſt other virtues might be conſidered as ſo many branches of Juſtice: For Piety is rendring what is due unto GOD; Temperance is but a debt of juſtice to Our ſelves; and charitable Relief is due to the poor and needy, &c. Juſtice conſidered in this manner is called *Univerſal Juſtice.*

Juſtice what?

All Virtues reducible to it.

Univerſal Juſtice.

Particular Juſtice may be conſidered either as regulating the behaviour of Equals one towards another, or of Superiours towards Inferiours.

Particular Juſtice.

Of the firſt ſort are the duties, which follow from the original and univerſal conſtitution of mankind, which every man may in ſtrictneſs exact of *all* other men, and are

Duties Abſolute. therefore term'd *Abſolute* duties, ſuch as, the not doing any damage; the repairing it, if done &c. So that it excludes not only the more groſs and ſhocking invaſion of anothers Right, ſuch as, murder, adultery, maiming, blows, theft &c. but alſo all kind of deceit in the management of buſineſs, all affront, contempt, ſcorn, neglect, any ſort of diſagreeable behaviour towards a perſon, other than what is due to him.

Other duties of Juſtice ſuppoſe ſome particular circumſtance or relation, and are therefore term'd *Conditional* or *Hypothetical.* And ſuch relation being built and depending upon ſome contract, either ſuppoſed in reaſon, or actually agreed upon and made between the parties related, the rule and meaſure of Juſtice here is to be eſtimated by the terms of the Contract; or, where thoſe are not expreſs, by the nature of the Buſineſs. Each party is preſumed to plight their fidelity for their reſpective performances; whereby the duty, obliging each, becomes reciprocal; ſo that a breach or violation ſucceeding *notoriouſly*, diſſolves the contract and ſets the innocent party at full liberty.

Conditional.

That branch of Particular Juſtice, which takes place in buying and ſelling, lending and borrowing, exchanging whether of things

or

or ſervices, &c. is called *Commutative Juſtice*; which requires that the things or actions, which we exhibit to another in virtue of a reciprocal compact, ſhould be anſwered by ſomewhat exactly of the ſame value in moral eſtimation. *Commutative.*

Particular Juſtice conſidered in the ſecond view is to be judged of according to the nature of thoſe different Societies of which men are members: and it may be deſcribed in general to conſiſt in a *Diſtribution* of the proper ſhare of the Goods of a Society to each member, according to the value of the pains and charges employed by him towards the preſervation of it, in proportion to the pains or charges contributed by others: And ſo likewiſe the Burthens of the Society are to be diſtributed according to the benefits received from the Society by this or that man, in proportion to the advantages, which the reſt of the members enjoy. — Analogous hereunto is the diſtribution of *Rewards* and *Puniſhments* in civil Societies, in proportion to the merits or demerits of each particular member. (And with a view to this, the term *Diſtributive Juſtice* is moſt commonly uſed.) *Diſtributive.*

Injuſtice is, either when we do any Evil to another, which we had no right to do, or, when we take from another, or deny him any Good *Injuſtice.*

Good which he poſſeſſes, or had a fair title to require.

When this is done ſtudiouſly and induſtriouſly to another, unconſenting and unprovoking, with intention and deliberate deſign of hurting or vexing, it is properly an *Injury*. Detriment occaſioned to another by our Negligence is likewiſe injurious; the faultineſs whereof is anſwerable to the degrees of diligence, and care which *ought* to have been employ'd, for the prevention of ſuch Detriment. And theſe may be determined by the nature of thoſe things, which were proper objects of our care, as they were more or leſs conſiderable, and conſequently required more or leſs caution. — But Harm, done caſually, in ignorance, and unwillingly, does not come under the name of Injury, but is called *Miſfortune*.

Injury.

Misfortune.

Inaſmuch as men are extremely prone to deceive themſelves, and judge too favourably in every reſpect, where themſelves and their own intereſts are concerned, we cannot too earneſtly endeavour to ſuppreſs that partial, that falſe Self-love, which is the weakneſs of our Nature; and for this purpoſe ſhould frequently have recourſe to the following rule,

Rule to ſecure our obſervance of Juſtice.

"Subſtitute Yourſelf in the room of another, when you conſider what is proper and "fit,

"fit for you to do upon any occaſion; ima-
"gine Yourſelf to be the perſon affected by
"ſuch and ſuch a behaviour; and then you
"will not only ſee, but alſo feel the reaſona-
"bleneſs or unreaſonableneſs of it." — There is an apprehenſion and pre-ſentiment, natural to mankind, that we ourſelves ſhall one time or other be dealt with as we deal with others; and we have a peculiar acquieſcence in ſuch a diſtribution. — And from hence we have the true notion of *Equity*; which may be ſaid to conſiſt in dealing fairly, honeſtly, and kindly, giving to Others what is due in *Reaſon* and *Conſcience*, tho' not formally contracted for by expreſs *Covenant*, nor recoverable by the force of *Law*. *Equity.*

Fortitude is a virtue diſpoſing us to a right conduct with regard to the dangers and difficulties of life; ſo as neither on the one hand to betray ourſelves and our happineſs by unreaſonable *Fear*, or *Effeminacy* and *Softneſs*; nor, on the other, to throw ourſelves in the way of unneceſſary evils and dangers by *Raſhneſs*. *Fortitude. what?* *its extremes.*

As to evils which threaten us at a diſtance, true Fortitude will preſerve the mind in a due temper and readineſs to make a proper uſe of ſuch expedients as prudence may offer, in order to ward off the blow, or prevent *Its exerciſe as to future Evils which are avoidable,*

vent the miſchief of it. This is proper *Fortitude.*

- as to preſent, or unavoidable.

If the evil be preſent or unavoidable, it animates the mind not to ſink under its weight, but to bend it ſelf to thoſe circumſtances which it finds to be not in its power to alter; not to aggravate its uneaſineſs by fretfulneſs, nor to ſeek relief by doing any thing contrary to right reaſon. This is *Patience.*

Patience.

Fortitude not reſtrain'd to any particular profeſſion, or bodily qualifications.

The object of Fortitude is by no means confined to military dangers: But all the evils of life, pain, poverty, diſgrace, &c. all the allurements of unlawful pleaſure and profit afford ample ſcope for the exerciſe of this virtue, to all degrees of men, whatever be the difference of their natural abilities, ſtrength, activity, &c. So that every man, who exerts himſelf, according to his abilities, and the ſubjects and occaſions in which he is converſant, is *Brave*, or has the virtue of *Fortitude.*

Contentedneſs.

To this may be added the virtue of *Contentedneſs*, which does not conſiſt in diveſting our ſelves of all inclinations for what we do not enjoy at preſent; but in not indulging any beyond the probability of ſucceſs; It does not forbid us making uſe of all our endeavours to preſerve any happineſs, that we are poſſeſſed of; but keeps us from being too fond of any, that we are in danger of loſing:

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It does not tie us down to our preſent condition; but prepares us, if it is a good one, for all the changes that may happen in it; and teaches us, if it is a bad one, to bear it well as long as it laſts.

Temperance is that virtue, whereby we are led to regulate our ſelves in the indulgence of our ſenſual appetites. *Temperance what?*

God hath ſuited different objects to our ſeveral bodily appetites and deſires: Theſe have all of them their proper bound; beyond which if we carry our enjoyments, and give our ſelves up, either to the looſe pleaſures of *Senſuality*, or to the brutiſhneſs of *Gluttony*, or to the mad ſallies of *intemperate Drinking*, we ſhall certainly diſappoint and hurt our ſelves. Each of theſe vices directly tends to render us contemptible in private life, and unfit to be truſted in publick; they cloud the underſtanding and ſtupify the judgment; they diſſipate our fortunes; and diſpoſe us to a general neglect of the duties which we owe our friends, our families, and our country; they are attended with miſerable intervals of remorſe and ſelf-diſlike, and withal bring on an untimely old age with a long train of infirmities and diſeaſes, rarely felt by the Chaſte and Temperate. *Senſuality, Intemperance, their folly.*

Apathy

Apathy. *Apathy* on the other hand implies that ſomething is amiſs in our moral character; inaſmuch as thereby we become deaf to the calls of Nature to uſe the neceſſary means of our preſervation. — Though it may be obſerved, that this caſe rarely happens.

Pleaſure of ſenſual enjoyments no conſtant proof of their innocency or reaſonableneſs. It ſhould be carefully remembred, that the pleaſure, which naturally accompanies every gratification of our ſenſual appetite, was no more intended to put us upon gratifying our ſelves in every particular inſtance, than our Eyes, which are the inſtruments whereby we receive pleaſure from viſible objects, were given us to look againſt the Sun or ſuch things, as are deſtructive of them.

Abſtinence its uſe. Occaſional Abſtinence, and the voluntary denying ourſelves many things which we deſire, are of admirable uſe to ſubdue our appetites within the bounds which right reaſon has aſſigned them: In this view it may become our duty to ſuſpend their gratification; as alſo it does, whenever the circumſtances formerly mentioned do not all concur to recommend it; particularly the *kind*, the *quantity*, the *ſeaſon*, the *manner* in which we take it.

Self denyal when a Duty?

Cardinal Virtues what? *Juſtice*, *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, together with *Prudence*, are ſometimes called *Cardinal* virtues, as being the hinges on which our moral conduct is chiefly found to turn. To

To theſe may be added ſeveral other virtues, which have an immediate reſpect to Others, and ſerve to regulate our behaviour in ſuch a manner as will be of benefit to our Fellow-Creatures.

Publick Spirit is a ſettled and reaſonable principle of Benevolence to, or hearty concern for the welfare of human Society. With regard to the bulk of mankind, it may with the utmoſt propriety be ſaid to conſiſt in the Love of our Neighbour, or of that part of human Society, which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence. *Publick Spirit.*

Patriotiſm is an intire uniform love of our Country; and is properly applicable to men of publick ſtations, whoſe ſphere of action is large, and extends as far as the whole Community to which they belong. *Patriotiſm.*

Friendſhip is a ſtrong and habitual inclination in two perſons to promote the good and happineſs of one another: The pleaſures ariſing from it are generally too warmly felt for it to need any incitement or ſpur from argument; And the beneficial ſervices which it adminiſters, are a great temptation to contract it upon motives inconſiſtent with Truth and Juſtice. *Friendſhip.*

Near a kin to which latter are the combinations of *Party*; which are often nothing *Party.*

elſe but a confederacy enter'd into upon the ſpecious pretences of more effectually ſerving the Publick, and carried on with a main view to Self-intereſt by all the arts of Falſhood and Diſhoneſty.

Compaſſion, *Compaſſion* is a virtue leading us to mitigate the calamities of other men, or to prevent them. It particularly ſingles out the unhappy, from whom can be expected no returns either of entertainment or future ſervice, for the objects of its favour; it eſteems the friendleſs condition of a man for a recommendation; it conſiders dejection and ſtruggling through the world, and all thoſe diſadvantageous circumſtances, which are uſually thought a ſufficient reaſon for neglect and overlooking a perſon, as a motive for relieving and helping him forward.

its Extremes. It is poſſible indeed for this amiable affection of mind to riſe ſo high beyond its juſt proportion, and to give ſo much uneaſineſs, as to incapacitate us from aſſiſting thoſe who are the objects of it. — But the other extreme is more frequently to be met with, namely, *Inſenſibility* to the diſtreſſes and ſorrows of our Fellow-Creatures.

Liberality, *Liberality* or *Bounty* conſiſts in a free diſtribution of the materials and means of happineſs, whether money, kind offices, &c. in ſuch

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a manner as ſhall contribute to the Good of Others, as well as to a man's Own ſatisfaction. This virtue when rightly exerciſed, is carried forward under the guidance of reaſon, and directed in ſeveral courſes and in different meaſure, as mens wants and neceſſities require, and as our own abilities will allow of; more particular regard being had to their nearneſs of relation, our own former obligations, and the perſonal virtues of thoſe whom we aſſiſt. *its exerciſe how to be regulated.*

Liberality in a donor ought to excite *Gratitude* in the receiver; that is, a readineſs to acknowledge and return a kindneſs received. *Gratitude.*

Frugality is a moderate affection to and purſuit of riches, in order to ſome good and uſeful end. *Frugality.*

Money is the great inſtrument of commerce in civil Societies. In order to enable ourſelves therefore to come in for our reaſonable ſhare of civil happineſs, and to provide for our families, and to exerciſe any rational act of Generoſity, it is requiſite that we learn both the value and uſe of money; that we extend our views forward, compute our income, and regulate our expences by it. *Uſe of Money to be learnt. Why?*

It is a vanity no leſs dangerous than ridiculous to act, as if Gentility conſiſted — in ſuffering a man's ſelf to be overreached and couſen'd *Prodigality deſcribed.*

not eſtimated by the Sum expended, but by the occaſion, rank and abilities of the Spender.

couſen'd by all about him, — in making a profuſion of wealth, either promiſcuous and undiſtinguiſh'd as to the occaſion, or in a degree above his quality, rank and circumſtances, — in emulating at random every expenſive inſtance of faſhionable diverſions, dreſs, equipage, hoſpitality, and magnificence; that is in other words, in *Prodigality*.

Ill conſequences of Prodigality.

The natural conſequence thereof is a fall into all the evils of Poverty and Vileneſs, render'd ſtill more inſupportable by the remembrance of former Plenty and Eſteem, and by the reflection that *Careleſneſs* and *Ill-husbandry* has deſerved them all. Hence it is, that in order to ſupply his extravagances and to keep off the evil day of theſe calamities, we ſee the *Prodigal*, in oppoſition to his, once, better, and perhaps truly generous ſenſe of things, abandoning himſelf to all the meanneſſes of a contracted Spirit; laying himſelf open to Corruption, oppreſſing his Dependants, defrauding his Creditors, and at length engaging in open acts of Outrage and Injuſtice. — Hence it is, that more men ſuffer by the Prodigal's profuſeneſs, than are benefited by it; and They commonly are the moſt benefited by it, who leaſt deſerve it.

Covetouſneſs.

Covetouſneſs, on the other hand, is the immoderate deſire and purſuit of riches for their own

own ſake, or without a due regard to or conſideration of the proper uſes of them.

Induſtry is the habit of application to ſome courſe of uſeful buſineſs and employment. Every condition of life affords ſcope for the exerciſe of this virtue; nor is any Fortune above, or can well ſubſiſt without it. For the advantages of life are not meerly offered to our acceptance, but to our acquiſition: and the powers of body and mind requiſite for that purpoſe are found to be of little uſe, unleſs improved by continual exerciſe.

Induſtry,

all men oblig'd to it.

Why?

The greater part of mankind are tied down to bodily labour, to procure ſuſtenance for themſelves and their families: Others, who are more at liberty from attending to theſe natural neceſſities, ſeem no leſs deſigned by Providence, than they are obliged by intereſt, to be ſerviceable to the Publick. As there is a particular education adapted to each particular employment, ſo there is a courſe of general diſcipline uſeful to all men; namely, the being put under good direction, and being inured to application, attention and activity, in oppoſition to liſtleſneſs, remiſneſs and ſloth. The former part of life therefore ſhould be conſidered as an important opportunity put into our hands, to qualify us to go thro' the difficulties of mature Age, to pro-

its exerciſe relative to the different conditions of men.

Youth the proper ſeaſon for attaining this habit.

The importance of improving this ſeaſon rightly.

procure ſuch attainments of diligence and skill, as will fit us for ſerving ourſelves and our Country in ſome proper calling, trade, profeſſion, or publick employment: which opportunity, if loſt, is ſcarce ever to be retrieved.

Induſtry the main ſupport of Honour.

A virtuous induſtry is ſuppoſed to be the ſource of all the Hereditary Honours, which ſome perſons enjoy above others: And in proportion as this excellency begins to fail, the Title will remain only to reproach the Bearer. — Add to this, that the large train of extravagance, folly and vice, which are the natural attendants upon the Idle man, cannot but impair that other ſecurity of His againſt diſgrace, namely his Fortunes; and thereby make him as miſerable, as he has ſuffered himſelf to become contemptible.

Diverſions not inconſiſtent with Induſtry.

But tho' this world was not intended to be a ſtate of perfect eaſe and ſatisfaction, ſo neither was it to be a meer ſcene of toil and ſorrow. God hath adapted ſeveral objects to give us delight, to ſerve as a diverſion from the cares, the buſineſs, and the ſorrows of life: theſe may be ſafely uſed under the direction of prudence. If no moral obligation be contradicted by our mirth, play, amuſements, &c. — if we do not engage in thoſe of a licentious and diſſolute ſort, which leave

How we are to regulate our ſelves in the uſe of them.

ill

ill impreſſions upon the mind; or which have a tendency to hurt our fortunes, and to lead us into the ſordid unworthy arts of cheating, &c. — if we do not ſpend ſo much time in them as to neglect the duties and offices of life, which belong to our ſtation and condition in the world; in ſhort, if there appears no inconſiſtency between them and our main end, (to which they may ſometimes be made directly ſubſervient) ſuch gratification is certainly innocent. On the other hand, to make diverſion, mirth and jollity our buſineſs; to be conſtantly hurrying about after ſome gay amuſement, ſome new gratification of ſenſe or appetite, is a moſt romantick ſcheme of life; it is purchaſing tranſitory entertainments at the expence of our wiſdom and virtue and laſting happineſs.

Modeſty is a virtue which regulates our behaviour with regard to the good eſteem of others. We are ſociable creatures, and therefore we as naturally endeavour to avoid diſgrace, neglect and contempt, as we do bodily pain; and deſire to be the object of eſteem and love, as much as we do any external goods. *Modeſty.* *its ground.*

Which affection of mind conſidered in the former reſpect is called a *Senſe of Shame*, and is attended with a fear of Blame or an uneaſineſs *Senſe of Shame.*

ſneſs upon the thought of having done any thing which will leſſen the valued eſteem which others have for us; which ſenſe was no doubt implanted in us as a guard to our virtue, and as a bridle to reſtrain us from doing ſhameful actions: In the latter, it is called a *Senſe of Honour*; which is attended with a deſire of Commendation, and was deſigned to incite and ſpur us on to the proſecution of what is good and virtuous.

Senſe of Honour.

Honour, the true method to obtain it.

Honour is the external teſtimony of another man's good eſteem. The proper and regular means of obtaining Honour is by employing and exerting ourſelves in whatever things are excellent; and eſpecially in things beneficial to men: for Honour is a tribute or reward that is paid by men; and the value of it riſes or falls in proportion to the ſuppoſed worth and wiſdom of thoſe by whom it is conferred. The deſire of Honour is called *Ambition*.

Ambition.

Emulation.

Emulation is the deſire and hope of equality with or ſuperiority over others, with whom we compare ourſelves. *Envy* attempts to attain this equality or ſuperiority by the means of bringing them down to or beneath its own level, inſtead of raiſing itſelf.

Ambition why commendable?

Preeminence, Dignities and offices of Honour are not only uſeful, but abſolutely neceſſary

ceſſary to the good government of the world; and without them there could be no peace, no order, no ſociety, nor civil commerce amongſt men: and therefore they are all of them the matter of a very laudable *Ambition*, provided they be gained honeſtly and uſed moderately. To be inſenſible of the calls to Honour therefore muſt argue a contempt of mankind, or baſe neglect of ourſelves. But, on the other hand, nothing is ſo dangerous to Society, becauſe nothing is ſo apt to put men upon violating the rules of juſtice, as an ill-regulated Ambition, eagerly bent upon forcing itſelf into preeminence at all events: nothing is more ridiculous, than that ſecret vain complacence of mind, with which weak men ſometimes think of ſetting themſelves in a rank of dignity and honour above their neighbours, by appearing foremoſt in the uſe of a gaudy dreſs, beſt accompliſhed in trifles, or moſt undaunted in vice.

Danger of ill regulated Ambition.

Virtue has of courſe a ſelf-ſatisfaction and applauſe accompanying it: But, as our virtue is imperfect, ſo this ſatisfaction and applauſe ſhould be proportionably check'd and moderated by a conſtant ſenſe of our imperfection. And this is that *Humility*, which is adapted to the preſent corrupted ſtate of mankind, and as much belongs to it as a perfect ſelf-ſa-

Humility.

the true notion of humility.

tisfaction does to a ſtate of innocence. To be humble therefore is not to deny ourſelves to be what we are, but to conceive rightly of ourſelves; — with regard to our ſtation among created Beings, raiſed much indeed above the common level, but ſtill infinitely beneath GOD; — with regard to the advantages which we enjoy, as indebted to Him for them all; — and alſo ſhort of that perfection and integrity, which might be expected from the due uſe of thoſe faculties which He hath given us. *Pride*, on the other hand, conſiſts in too high an eſteem for ourſelves, and the good qualities, or things which we poſſeſs. As falſe notions of Humility are apt to overwhelm men with unreaſonable confuſion and *abjection*, which diſables them from attempting what is great and glorious; ſo Pride or Arrogance, while it aſſumes and attributes to itſelf more than is due, is the parent of raſh undertakings, of haughtineſs and inſolence, of ſcorn and diſdain towards thoſe whom we think beneath us.

Pride.

Abjection.

Meekneſs what?

Meekneſs is a virtue particularly exerciſed in regulating the paſſion of Anger. It implies in it a good degree of what we call eaſineſs of temper, a freedom from miſtruſt, a diſpoſition to believe well of our neighbour, a readineſs to forego our right for the ſake of

of peace, as well as in the way of compaſſion.

Paſſion of Anger why implanted in us?

It is neceſſary for the very ſubſiſtence of the World, that the vices of falſhood, injuſtice and cruelty, villainy and baſeneſs, ſhould be prevented or puniſhed; that diſorderly behaviour ſhould be corrected. Theſe are the proper objects of Anger; the exerciſe whereof on a right object, and in a due proportion, is a generous and noble virtue, and one of the common bands by which Society is held together and the peace of it ſecured.

The proper objects of Anger.

Lenity may be carried to a degree of *ſtupidity*, ſo far as to obſtruct the execution of juſtice to ourſelves and others: It then becomes a weakneſs and a fault on the one ſide.

Stupidity,

Paſſion is the common word for the other extreme. When this ariſes frequently and on ſmall occaſions, eſpecially in languid tempers, it is called *Peeviſhneſs*. It ſhews itſelf differently in different men, according to the peculiarities of perverſeneſs and wayward humour: ſometimes flying out into open outrage, at others venting itſelf in ill language and hard words, which it becomes no body either to receive or give; all the while keeping men uneaſy in themſelves, as well as making them ſo to all about them.

Paſſion,

Peeviſhneſs.

Anger or Reſentment is uſually diſtinguiſhed into *Defenſive* and *Offenſive*. Defenſive reſentment,

Defenſive and Offenſive reſentment.

Def. reſentment always lawful.

ſentment, as it is deſigned to qualify us to reſiſt and defeat ſudden force, violence and oppreſſion, is always lawful. But inaſmuch as men are found to have naturally a greater ſenſibility to, and are more deeply intereſted in whatever concerns themſelves than others, and are thereby led to carry their reſentment too high for injuries done or intended to themſelves; for this reaſon, the exerciſe of *Offenſive* reſentment in civil Societies is reſerved to the civil Magiſtrate, as the more likely perſon to proportion rightly his indignation to the particular ill action it is exerciſed upon, and to anſwer the true ends of puniſhments: And theſe are, either the amendment of the offender by bringing him to a ſenſe of duty and inclination to practiſe it; or the removing the incorrigible out of the way of being further miſchievous; or the intimidating others from offending.

Exerciſe of Offenſive reſentment, why reſerved to the Magiſtrate: the proper end of civil puniſhments.

Reſentment not inconſiſtent with good will.

Reſentment is by no means inconſiſtent with good-will; for we ſee that truly affectionate Parents grow angry and correct their Children, for their own ſakes, when they run into danger or hurt themſelves. But if ever Reſentment comes to deſtroy good-will intirely, and produces miſchief for miſchief ſake, it then is called *Malice* and *Revenge*, a vice which, if generally indulged, would

ſoon

ſoon propagate itſelf ſo as to lay waſte the world.

Veracity, taken in its largeſt extent, is the ſame with *Sincerity*, and ſignifies our ſhewing and appearing to be no other than we are in truth and reality: — more properly, it relates to the ſtrict regulation of what we *ſay* by the ſtandard of truth. *Veracity,*

To appear worſe than we really are is a moſt prepoſterous kind of ambition, and very prejudicial to the cauſe of virtue: to appear better, may ſeem to be an excuſable partiality towards ourſelves. *as oppoſed to Diſſimulation and Hypocriſy.*

But ſince mutual commerce between man and man ſubſiſts upon the preſumption that ſuch and ſuch a courſe of action is naturally ſignificative of a correſpondent character and diſpoſition; were the inſtances of men's appearing in a falſe character to become frequent, that ground of confidence muſt neceſſarily be deſtroyed: and men would be diſcouraged in the performance of ſocial duties. It therefore is of great importance to Society, that the characters of men without faith and honeſty ſhould be known, in order to prevent the innocent from being deceived or betray'd. *Hypocriſy, the evil influence of it upon matters of Commerce.*

But with regard to vices properly perſonal, conſidering the contagiouſneſs of ill examples, it *open Vice more deteſtable than Hypocriſy,*

it were to be wiſhed, that when men will not be perſwaded to be really virtuous, they would at leaſt not publickly act their vices: For of the two characters, worthleſs as they are, the Hypocrite is leſs intolerable, leſs miſchievous to Society, and in that reſpect leſs to be deteſted, than the openly vicious and prophane.

Why?

Concealment of our Sentiments ſometimes right.

Let it be obſerved further, that when conſiderate men think it their duty to be diffident of their own ſenſe of things, they may fairly conceal it; and ill deſerve to have their moderation and reſerve branded with the odious names of craft, diſſimulation and hypocriſy. As ill does the contrary temper deſerve to be encouraged under the notion of *Openneſs* and *Honeſty*; while it is in truth no other than uſurping to itſelf a privilege of being headſtrong and ſelf-willed; of giving a looſe to every paſſion that is uppermoſt; dealing out its cenſures or commendations according to every ſilly ſurmiſe of its own; and in conſequence thereof exerting itſelf with ſuch impetuoſity, as, if others were to do the like, would render Society inſupportable and the living in it impracticable.

False notions of openheartedneſs and honeſty.

The ends of Speech.

The purpoſe of Speech is to communicate our thoughts to each other, *primarily*, for buſineſs and improvement; *ſecondarily*, for entertainment.

As

As mankind are endued with Reaſon, or a capacity of diſtinguiſhing between Truth and Falſhood, ſo are they naturally endued with Veracity, or a regard to Truth. And this ought to be the invariable rule of our Speech, excepting where we are under ſome expreſs obligation to the contrary: for, *Juſtice* obliges us not to divulge a ſecret wherewith we are intruſted; *Charity* may require that we do what we can to divert an angry man in his purſuit of the innocent. Theſe and ſuch like caſes being excepted, there is in all ingenuous minds a conſtant ſhame attending the perverſion of this uſeful inſtrument of mutual intercourſe in a man's ſelf, and a ſtrong abhorrence or contempt of it in others. *Odiouſneſs of Falſhood.*

The higheſt diſregard to Truth is ſeen in thoſe who maliciouſly endeavour to deceive others, and for that purpoſe invent a *Lye* without any foundation at all. Criminal likewiſe is it in men to ſuffer themſelves to be biaſſed and deceived through negligence or prejudice. In a conſiderable degree are they alſo to be blamed, who, however careful not to invent a Lye, yet propagate it with heightening circumſtances, after it is invented. And, laſtly, a degree, though a lower degree, of Falſhood is it knowingly to let a Lye paſs without contradiction. *Lying, other violations of Veracity.*

Talkative-

Unſeaſonable diſcourſe,

Talkativeneſs, or a wanton diſpoſition to be talking without regard to the ſeaſonableneſs of what we ſay, is an offence againſt this virtue, although no injury or falſhood be intended thereby. For as it implies great folly, and a trifling ſpirit, and great unconcernedneſs for the welfare of others, ſo it hath a natural tendency to vitiate the mind, to create in it great indifference to truth, and is in fact the occaſion of numberleſs evils and vexations in Life.

prophane, obſcene, &c.

But when Talk is directly offenſive to religion, virtue, good manners, tending to diſſoluteneſs, ſlander, defamation, or divulging of ſecrets, it is a complicated crime, and falls under the cenſure due to impiety, injuſtice, malice, treachery, &c.

Ridicule & Drollery.

Add to this, that an extravagant diſpoſition to *Ridicule* and *Drollery*, whether it be by accuſtoming ourſelves to make a mock at ſerious ſubjects, or by indulging a ludicrous turn in the abuſive way of raillery, is very incongruous in itſelf and pernicious in its conſequences; the former being uſually found to pervert men's natural ſenſe of good and evil; the latter being an unjuſtifiable inſult upon the peace and quiet of our innocent Neighbour.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

BESIDES that courſe of behaviour which has already been referr'd to, and which on all hands is allowed to carry in the notion of it ſomething morally virtuous and good, or morally vitious and evil, there are actions, which, however they come to be ranked under no other general name than that of *Indecencies*, yet appear odious, and ſometimes ſhocking to human nature; and are therefore what men are obliged to avoid in point of morality and virtue. What are called *Decencies* of behaviour, though they may ſeem to have no *particular* good tendency, yet are often found to have a *general* good one; — they are in a manner neceſſary to our being received upon tolerable good terms in the world; they cheriſh in mankind a mutual reverence for each other; they more or leſs diſpoſe men for the enjoyment of all the common bleſſings of life; and thereby promote humanity, friendſhip, good nature and civility: and on the other hand, the greateſt evils of ſocial life often take their riſe from ſomewhat of this kind, which was thought of too little importance to be attended to.

Indecency of Behaviour.

Decencies.

their importance.

An approbation of ſome actions, and a diſlike of others are found to be eſtabliſhed through-

Some rules of Decency univerſally the ſame,

throughout the world, by a ſecret and tacit conſent; as in the inſtance of covering or diſcloſing ſome parts of the body. Other actions are conſidered as decent or indecent, according to the faſhion and cuſtom of each particular country; thus, in ſome it is a mark of reſpect to uncover the head; in others, to cover it.

others local.

Under this claſs of excellencies we may rank *Modeſty* of deportment, *Affability*, *Good-breeding*, and, which crowns all the reſt, *Diſcretion*.

Modeſty.

Modeſty of deportment, as diſtinguiſhed from the Modeſty above mentioned, (p. 55.) implies a diligent ſollicitude not to give offence to others by our forwardneſs and diſreſpect; particularly with regard to our Superiours of any kind, in ſtation, in years, in knowledge or experience. To be negligent of what others think of us, to have no reſtraint from, no regard to others in our behaviour, is properly *Impudence*; and is commonly the forerunner of debauchery, violence, and contempt of Laws. To refrain from doing what is juſt to ourſelves, or right in its own nature, for fear of diſpleaſing others is a falſe modeſty, ſometimes called *Sheepiſhneſs*; a weakneſs particularly dangerous to Youth, betraying it contrary to its

its extremes.

Impudence.

Sheepiſhneſs.

own deſire and inclination to be hurried on by ill-deſigning men to evil actions and places.

The juſt medium between both, eſpecially with regard to ſuch as are engaged in active life, may be called a becoming *Confidence*; not conceited of its own worth, nor yet altogether inſenſible of it. This is requiſite to give vigour and ſprightlineſs to men's conduct, to prevent them from being overaw'd or baffled by another's boldneſs; at the ſame time it leaves the mind open to inſtruction, and the will ready to ſubmit to the direction of a better judgment. *Confidence.*

Affability or *Courteouſneſs* is a virtue which ſhews itſelf in an eaſy obliging manner of Addreſs; in behaving towards all men, as far as we reaſonably may, with gentleneſs and condeſcenſion; in a readineſs to do them any act of civility and ordinary kindneſs; in putting a candid conſtruction upon their words and actions; and upon ſome occaſions likewiſe, in giving up our own inclinations in order to gratify the humour of thoſe with whom we converſe. *Affability.*

Although this excellency in a great meaſure ariſes from a natural evenneſs of temper, and though the appearance of it in its beſt luſtre is more eſpecially owing to the happy *Why reckon'd a moral Virtue.*

happy opportunity of a liberal education; yet it certainly deſerves a place among moral virtues: Becauſe it is right and reaſonable in itſelf; — the improvement of it into a habit requires care and diligence; — and the extremes of it always denote ſomething very wrong in our moral diſpoſition:

its extremes.

Theſe extremes are *Flattery* or *Fawning*, and *Maroſeneſs*.

Flattery,

Flattery is obſerved to be no leſs indiſcriminate than officious in teſtifying its approbation of the qualities and conduct of other men. — This is ſometimes owing to weakneſs and want of judgment; but more frequently to artifice and deſign; in which caſe it is a vice juſtly odious for the miſchief which it does, and is particularly dangerous by reaſon of the difficulty of guarding ourſelves againſt it.

odiouſneſs and danger of it.

Flatterer deſcribed.

It is the *Flatterer*'s buſineſs to prey upon the weakneſs or ignorance of others: Accordingly with great pretence of kindneſs he thruſts himſelf upon the acquaintance, eſpecially of great men. By borrowing your humour he inſinuates himſelf into your affections; is the foremoſt to applaud you, eſpecially in every act of folly or extravagance; and to make you jealous of every virtuous adviſer: And having thus ingroſs'd your confidence, by his intrigues he introduces him-

himſelf into your buſineſs, and pries into your ſecrets; or intangles you in vice; and then maſters your purſe, or elſe betrays and abuſes you.

Moroſeneſs, on the other hand, is a certain ſurlineſs of behaviour, implying a determined reſolution not to comply, nor to be pleaſed with any thing that is ſaid or done by Others; equally cenſorious of their failings, and undervaluing their merits: Towards Superiours it ſhews itſelf in obſtinacy and diſreſpect; towards Equals, in ſuperciliouſneſs and rudeneſs; towards Inferiours, in inſolence and domineering. *Moroſeneſs.*

Good-breeding is the abovementioned virtue of Affability adapted to the innocent cuſtoms of the Place in which we live, and to the particular diſpoſitions of the Perſons with whom we converſe. *Good-breeding.* *what it conſiſts in.*

Of this kind is the uſe of civil and reſpectful language in converſation, which certainly becomes all people: — even where true love and reſpect are wanting, it is decent and of good example to avoid all unneceſſary harſhneſs and offenſiveneſs in our expreſſions.

Good-breeding alſo requires that we offend not another's ſenſe or imagination by the uſe of our liberty; — that we do not abandon ourſelves to any ſuch affected negligence, any

ſuch

Demeanour of Body.

ſuch indecent poſtures or geſtures of body, as betray our having a greater regard to our own eaſe than to the Perſons with whom we are in company; the ſolemnity of the Place; or the ſerioufneſs of the Buſineſs in which we are engaged.

Ceremony and Form,

Hereunto likewiſe may be referr'd the regulation of our exteriour carriage and behaviour by the obſervance of *Ceremony* and *Form*. —'Tis true theſe things conſidered by themſelves appear quite indifferent; but, upon the whole, they will be found ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that without them neither Religion nor Morality could flouriſh in Society. If a due ſubordination of one condition to another be requiſite to men's living in peace and order; for the ſame reaſon it is proper that cuſtom and uſage ſhould mark out that diſtinction of Quality and Condition; which being done, it muſt argue ſome ſort of weakneſs of judgment, or want of conſideration, or great frowardneſs of temper, in any perſon to ſet up his own imagination againſt that of the Publick, and to take a pride in acting out of ſpite and oppoſition to eſtabliſhed faſhion and cuſtom.

Why neceſſary?

Ill-breeding to act contrary to eſtabliſh'd Form and Ceremony.

Good-breeding ſeen in the uſe of proper Habit and Dreſs.

The ſame obſervation may be extended to *Habit* or *Dreſs*; both as to the *Matter* or Subſtance, and to the *Mode* or Faſhion of it.

The

The cuſtom of all civilized countries hath regulated ſome general ſtandard of Dreſs and Habit, as moſt convenient to diſcriminate people one from another, in point of Age and of Quality, to prevent all diſreſpect, diſorder, and confuſion. *Standard of Dreſs how regulated and why.*

In this view, it is both inconvenient and indecent for men to affect a garb and dreſs unbefitting their condition. And as the judgment of the world is apt to ſet a mark of lightneſs upon innovators therein; ſo in wiſe communities this kind of luxury hath been very juſtly reſtrained by penal laws. For as foppery of dreſs is uſually owing to an affectation of greater ſuperiority than is truly due to the wearers, and thus becomes the accidental occaſion of pride; ſo is it apt to withdraw them from more grave and ſerious objects, in which they might and ſhould be better employed. And if it likewiſe carries men beyond their juſt and reaſonable abilities; — if what ſhould maintain them in neceſſaries is trifled off in ſhew and gay appearance; — if exorbitant debts are contracted to ſupport this vanity, it cannot (trifling as the occaſion may appear) be reconciled with moral honeſty. *The ground of ſumptuary Laws in this reſpect.* *Foppery often immoral. Why?*

It may be obſerved in general, that rules of conduct, eſpecially upon the matters laſt men- *Rules of conduct in theſe matters liable to be*

miſtaken, and ridiculed.

mentioned, though never ſo cautiouſly laid down, will be ſubject to miſconſtruction and miſtake, and conſequently to ridicule, from thoſe, who are diſpoſed to miſrepreſent them, or to animadvert upon the aukwardneſs or miſcarriages of ſuch as fail in reducing them to practice. For this reaſon, let men's ſincerity and good intention be what it will, the excellency of *Diſcretion* is further requiſite.

Diſcretion requiſite to give them their due efficacy.

Diſcretion, what?

Diſcretion is the ability of behaving ourſelves prudently and decently on all occaſions, towards all men; ſo as to attain the end we aim at by means, not only juſt and righteous in themſelves, but alſo well-approved and beſt liked by others; to do what ſhould and muſt be done, in the moſt becoming and acceptable manner.

the great uſefulneſs of it;

Without this the beſt of virtues loſe their power and efficacy in the world; *that is*, there is no compariſon betwixt the good they do under a weak imprudent management, and what they would do, if wiſely and diſcreetly ordered. Nor is it to be neglected in the ſmalleſt matters; it being that which gives grace and ornament to all that men ſay or do, and indeed which makes them converſable animals.

deſerves to be ſtudied.

It is hard to tell how it is to be acquired; but yet the want of it is ſenſibly diſcerned on all

all occaſions, and appears in all the follies and abſurdities that people commit. It therefore ought to be ſtudied much more carefully than it uſually is; ſince every body is the better for it themſelves, and the more ſerviceable to others.

CHAP. X.

THE great buſineſs of Virtue being to direct and controul the exerciſe of our ſeveral paſſions; and the greater part of theſe depending upon, and borrowing the main part of their ſtrength from the natural Temperament or Conſtitution of men's bodies; hence Virtue and Vice are ſometimes ſpoken of as altogether *conſtitutional*. *Virtue, why ſometimes ſaid to be Conſtitutional.*

And certain it is that the principles of all our paſſions and humours are born into the world with us, and that ſome conſtitutions carry with them a natural incentive to the warmer and more active paſſions, of boldneſs, ambition, &c; Others give an indolent turn to our ſeveral faculties, rendring our paſſions cool and even; A third ſort diſpoſe the mind to levity, freedom and cheerfulneſs; and A fourth to pertinaciouſneſs, induſtry, thoughtfulneſs, &c. *How far ſo.*

Theſe and ſeveral other Temperaments are combined in different degrees in different

men; and according to that which bears ſway above the reſt and appears chiefly predominant, Naturaliſts uſually give the denomination; and in common life we call the man ſo *temper'd*. The ſame obſervation is applicable to thoſe alterations, to which our conſtitutions are continually liable, from *health* or *ſickneſs*, difference of *age* &c.

Some Vices National,

how accounted for.

It has been obſerved moreover that particular Vices are practiſed more frequently in ſome Countries than in others; which are therefore thought to be the peculiar and natural growth of the *Climate*; — The air, diet, &c. which people uſe, have certainly great influence in altering the conſtitution of the Body; and this again by its cloſe and intimate union gives a new turn to the inclinations of the Soul. Such propenſities of human nature, being as it were mechanical, are not by any care or pains, by any art or diligence, to be quite extinguiſhed: There will be evermore a tendency and biaſs to this or that ſide, as all men feel.

Theſe conſiderations do not deſtroy the blameableneſs of Vice,

However, natural conſtitution can at moſt be ſaid to contain but the ſeeds of Vice; The growth of them up to a ſtate of maturity, their producing miſchievous and evil effects, depends upon our own negligence and miſmanagement. On the other hand, we may

with

with equal propriety be ſaid to carry in our conſtitutions the ſeeds of Virtue; which require care and diligence in order to their cultivation. So that the demerit of the former is juſtly chargeable upon us by way of guilt; and our improvement in virtue redounds to our praiſe and commendation.

or, the commendableneſs of Virtue.

Beſides this of bodily conſtitution, which may properly be ſaid to be ſeated *in* our nature, ſeveral other *external* circumſtances might be mentioned, which are of great influence in forming men's moral *character*; ſuch are Education, Company and Example, Courſe of life and Profeſſion: Theſe are found to give an imperceptible biaſs to the whole frame of our mind, and our conduct thence ariſing; they ſerve indifferently either to correct and improve, or to vitiate and debaſe our natures; they ſeverally open a different ſcene whereon our natural excellencies may be diſplay'd to advantage; they afford occaſions, circumſtances, and objects exciting our paſſions, and means for gratifying them. And therefore it is a matter of mighty conſequence to every man, in reſpect of moral attainments, what courſe of life, education, company, and profeſſion he engages in.

External circumſtances influencing us to Virtue or Vice.

To know our duty is no doubt a neceſſary ſtep towards performing it: But to go over the

Theory of Virtue not neceſſarily productive

of virtuous improvements.

the theory of it in our thoughts, to be able to talk well, and to draw fine pictures of it, is far from neceſſarily or certainly conducing to form an habit of it in him, who thus employs himſelf; unleſs he at the ſame time inforces upon his mind a practical ſenſe of it.

Speculative knowledge however is conducive to the becoming good, namely, the Knowledge of our ſelves.

The ground-work upon which we may hope to proceed with ſucceſs in that buſineſs is a ſerious endeavour to form juſt notions concerning the true nature and circumſtances of our Being in its ſeveral parts, our *Soul* and *Body*; and concerning the duties which we owe to ourſelves in each reſpect, and the great conſequence of diſcharging them aright.

And here we ſhould conſider how much our nature is raiſed above the low and groveling ſtate of the Brutes, and what great advantage is given us in our faculty of reaſoning and recollection to ſubdue the irregular indulgence of our appetites.

of the true nature and conſequences of Vice.

It ſhould further be conſidered how unqueſtionably little, as well as precarious, the pleaſures and profits of Vice are at the beſt; and how ſoon they muſt be parted with at the longeſt,—what inconveniencies and ſufferings they are apt to bring after them? what infamy and deteſtation? what daily, what hourly diſappointments, liſtleſſneſs and ſatiety?

They

They are naturally attended with ſome ſort of uneaſineſs, and not uncommonly with great vexation and remorſe; and above all with the natural preſages of conſcience, that the juſt Governour of the world will fully teſtify His diſpleaſure againſt Vice by the puniſhment of it in a future ſtate.

of the advantages and excellency of Virtue.

On the other hand, Virtue and innocence, as ſuch, naturally procure ſeveral conſiderable advantages; ſuch as are that inward ſecurity and peace, which keeps the mind open to the ſeveral gratifications of life; — that complacency, ſatisfaction, and even joy of heart, which neceſſarily accompanies the real exerciſe of virtuous affections; — that favour and friendlineſs which the generality of the world, and which good men eſpecially, are apt to pay to a good character, ſo far as it is known. — Add to this, that with regard to the reſtraints and confinement, which are often complained of, as attending a courſe of Virtue; whoever will conſider the reſtraints from fear and ſhame, the diſſimulation, the mean arts of concealment, and ſervile compliances, (one or other of which belong to almoſt every courſe of vice,) will ſoon be convinced, that the man of virtue is by no means upon a diſadvantage in this reſpect; — eſpecially, when virtue is become habitual; when the temper

of

of it is acquired, what was before confinement ceaſes to be ſo, and becomes choice and delight.

Virtue and Intereſt generally connected.

There is ſeldom any inconſiſtency between our Duty and what is *called* Intereſt: It is much ſeldomer that there is any inconſiſtency between what is *really* our preſent Intereſt; meaning by Intereſt, Happineſs and Satisfaction. Self-Love, though confined to the intereſt of the preſent world, does in general perfectly coincide with Virtue and leads us to one and the ſame courſe of life.

What is to be ſaid to thoſe inſtances where Virtue is confeſſedly unfortunate.

But whatever exceptions there are to this, whether ariſing from the government of the world by general laws; or, from our Creator's deſign to make our preſent condition, what it was intended to be, a ſtate of Diſcipline, (which exceptions after all are much fewer than they are commonly thought) all will be ſet right at the final diſtribution of things: It being a manifeſt abſurdity to ſuppoſe Evil finally prevailing over Good under the conduct and adminiſtration of a Being infinite in wiſdom, goodneſs and power. And hereof every good man, acting under the ſerious apprehenſions of Religion, feels an implicite hope ariſing within himſelf upon every exerciſe of virtue; which aſſurance therefore ſhould be taken into the account of the

pre-

preſent advantages of virtue: as, on the other hand, the fears of future puniſhment may be reckon'd a conſiderable diſadvantage wherewith vice is always, more or leſs, attended in its preſent ſtate.

As an inforcement to all this, it ſhould be remembered, that we are acting in the view of a Being, in whoſe hands are the iſſues of happineſs and miſery; and who is in a much higher ſenſe the object of reverence and love, than all the world beſides: In which caſe no ſatisfaction could be taken from a wicked action done under His eye, comparable to that ſettled ſatisfaction of approving ourſelves to His unerring judgment.

These conſiderations inforc'd by ſetting God before us. How?

Theſe ſeveral principles of action, *viz.* a regard to GOD's Authority and Right over us, — to the Excellence of Virtue, — and to our own chief Intereſt, are not only all three coincident, but each of them is in itſelf a juſt and natural motive: And that man who begins a good life from any one of them and perſeveres in it, as he is already in ſome degree, ſo he cannot fail of becoming more and more of that character which is correſpondent to the conſtitution of his nature as *Moral*; and to the relation in which he ſtands to GOD as his moral Governour and Lord; nor conſequently can he fail of obtaining that happineſs,

These ſeveral principles of Virtuous conduct all conſiſtent with each other.

neſs, which this conſtitution and relation neceſſarily ſuppoſe connected with that character.

Practice of Virtue not to be delay'd, nor to be ſuſpended. Why?

But the entrance upon the practice of Virtue is a buſineſs which admits of no delay: it muſt be perſiſted in with reſolution, with uniformity and ſteadineſs. For the leaſt voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumſtances, though but in thought, will increaſe a tendency towards what is wrong, 'till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conſpiring, we are drawn into an actual deviation from Virtue. And then we know not how much the firſt full overt-act of irregularity may diſorder our inward conſtitution, unſettle the adjuſtments, and alter the proportions, in which the uprightneſs of our Make conſiſts. Repetition of indulgences will go on to produce Habits, and corrupt us in our ſettled character, and render our paſſions exceſſive, proportionably to the repeated irregularities in occaſional Acts.

Danger of Temptations.

It ſhould alſo be remembered, that in the caſe of habitual affections, or ſuch as are moſt natural, whenever the objects are preſent to the Senſes or offer themſelves to the Mind, our Affections will be excited and make themſelves felt, whether we will or no; not only before all conſideration whether they can be grati-

gratified conſiſtently with innocence and prudence, but after it is found that they cannot: In this caſe, the Affection, though its being excited, and its continuing ſome time in the mind be innocent, as far as it is natural, yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency to incline us to venture upon unlawful means to obtain them, and to put us in ſome danger of it.

Temptation to be avoided.

It ſhould therefore ſeem a neceſſary part of proper diſcipline and exerciſe for the ſtrengthening and improving the principle of virtue, to avoid as much as may be all occaſions naturally exciting ill propenſions, and to divert our attention therefrom by diligent application to ſome uſeful buſineſs and employment. — to accuſtom our appetites to ſtand reſtrained much within the bounds of what is ſtrictly lawful.

Caution & Diſcipline to be uſed.

Rules of Conduct for that purpoſe.

— to have a regard to the dangerous part of our character, our particular favourite Paſſion Intereſt or Purſuit; and to keep a ſteady eye over ourſelves in that reſpect.

— to apprize ourſelves of the ſnares and temptations to vice, and to put ourſelves upon our guard againſt them; never to pleaſe ourſelves with the opportunities which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we diſlike, or of obtaining what we deſire, by un-

Rules of Conduct.

lawful means, when we either cannot do it, or at leaſt ſo eaſily, by lawful means.

— to reflect often upon our experience of the deceits of wickedneſs, and the infinite diſorders in the world conſequent upon its vitiouſneſs.

— to recollect the ſtrong impreſſions once made upon us by the examples of thoſe, who have in fact ſupported themſelves, when all other enjoyments have failed them, with the ſatisfaction of a good conſcience, the having made the purſuit of what is juſt and good the general bent of their mind and end of their life.

— to heighten in our minds the love of virtue and abhorrence of vice by the peruſal of ſerious and good books; and by applying to ourſelves thoſe reproofs and inſtructions, which we meet with ſuitable to the ſtate of our own mind, and the courſe of our behaviour.

— to accuſtom ourſelves always in all matters in which we are engaged, be they greater or leſs, to act upon the principle of right reaſon and equity, inſtead of humour and mere inclination.

— to have our regards frequently directed towards the final conſequences of our behaviour, and that approaching period of our days, which muſt deprive us of all thoſe advantages

vantages for which we ſometimes proſtitute ourſelves by Sin.

—and, above all, to maintain conſtant intercourſe with God our Guardian and Governour; and to cheriſh in ourſelves a ſenſe of our dependence upon Him by daily Prayer. Here as in his more immediate preſence ſhould we bring our moral concerns home to ourſelves by recollection and ſelf-examination, review our conduct, and recover ourſelves out of that forgetfulneſs of ourſelves and our ſtate, in which 'tis manifeſt the far greater part of men are apt to paſs away their whole lives. This will give great weight and efficacy to our endeavours to enforce good reſolutions upon our minds, and alſo be a ſecurity againſt the turns and doubles of our heart, amidſt the various temptations of the world, whether ariſing from the hurry of buſineſs or the allurements of pleaſure. And this at laſt will be found to be the band whereby all virtues are chain'd and knit together; inaſmuch as whoever upon good principles obſerves to fulfill One, will ſeldom fail of diſcharging All: He will ſee the ſame reaſon and the ſame command of God for All as much as One.

Devotion a great help to moral Virtue.

Piety the band of Moral Virtues. Why?

All this is requiſite ſuppoſing ourſelves *upright*; we ſhould even then want to improve and raiſe ourſelves to a higher and more ſecure

The foregoing rules urg'd from the conſideration of

our being depraved Creatures.

cure ſtate of virtue. But inaſmuch as we are *depraved* creatures, we want not only to be improved, but to be renewed; to wear out vitious habits and recover our ſtrength of Self-Government.

How Chriſtianity improves upon Morality.

In this view the light of *Chriſtianity* is of ſingular uſe, as it has aſcertained and given us a draught of that ſyſtem of duties, which we call Natural Religion, in its genuine purity, and in ſo clear a manner as to approve itſelf, almoſt intuitively, to a reaſonable mind upon ſeeing it propoſed; — as it has exemplified them in the life of our Saviour, — and confirmed them by a new proof, the authoritative atteſtation of Miracles; — and laſtly, as it affords additional motives to the practice of them, by bringing to light the doctrine of a future ſtate of Rewards and Puniſhments; on the one ſide, it ſets before us the danger of a courſe of wickedneſs, and on the other, encourages our endeavours after holineſs and virtue, by giving full aſſurance of the efficacy of ſincere Repentance.

This not the only end of Chriſtianity.

But beſides enforcing the practice of natural piety and virtue, Chriſtianity has enlarged the ſcene and opened a proſpect of many things new in the ſtate of mankind, and in the government of the world: It has acquainted us with ſeveral relations, concerning which the

the voice of Natural Reaſon is altogether ſilent; and conſequently has extended the rule of our duty to ſeveral new particular objects.

What is the more immediate ſubject of the Chriſtian Revelation?

For Chriſtianity contains a revelation of a particular diſpenſation of things not at all diſcoverable by Reaſon, — a diſpenſation of Providence carrying on by God the *Son* and the *Holy Ghoſt* for the recovery of Mankind out of their preſent fallen wretched condition, and for the raiſing them to the perfection and final happineſs of their nature.

New duties revealed.

Upon this diſpenſation of Providence is founded a particular inſtitution of Religion, and in conſequence thereof ſeveral obligations of duty, unknown before, are revealed, —

Means preſcribed for the attainment of the end propos'd to mankind by the Chriſtian Revelation.

Means are expreſsly appointed for obtaining the benefits of that reconciliation, which our Saviour made for us unto God the *Father* by his death, and of that aſſiſtance of the *Holy Ghoſt*, which is neceſſary to renew our nature in the degree requiſite for our being qualified for that ſtate, which *Chriſt* is gone to prepare for his Diſciples.

In ſtating the Obligation to Chriſtian Duties the truth of Chriſtianity muſt be preſuppos'd.

The truth of Chriſtianity being ſuppoſed, (and the direct proof of it is drawn from the Miracles wrought and Prophecies fulfilled in its confirmation) it is evident at firſt ſight that it cannot in any wiſe be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or diſobey thoſe commands:

Direct proof of it whence to

be drawn? Obligation to Chriſtian Duties is ſtrictly moral.

mands: *for inſtance*, The obligation we are under of paying religious regards, ſuch as religious reverence, honour, love, truſt, gratitude, fear, hope, to GOD the *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt*, as well as to the *Father*, is an obligation of reaſon, and is ſtrictly moral; They all ariſe from the *reſpective relations* of Mediator, Sanctifier and Governour, which the three Perſons of the Godhead ſtand in to mankind; and from the Offices, which appear, from Scripture, to belong to thoſe Divine Perſons in the Goſpel-diſpenſation, and not out of the *manner* in which we are informed of them. There is therefore no reaſon to think, but that neglect of behaving ſuitably to thoſe relations diſcovered by *Revelation* will be attended with the ſame kind of conſequences under GOD's Government, as neglecting to behave ſuitably to any other relations made known to us by *Reaſon*. If the benefits of Chriſtianity are worth the obtaining, it can be no ſlight or indifferent matter, whether we make uſe of the means expreſsly commanded by GOD for that purpoſe.

Why?

Folly of neglecting them.

Thus are we brought to *Chriſtianity*, whoſe ſcheme or ſyſtem of Doctrines and Morals, or Duties thence ariſing, can be learnt only from the *Holy Scriptures*.

A TABLE

Of reference to Engliſh diſcourſes and ſermons upon moral Subjects ranged according to the order of the foregoing Introduction.

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Upon relative duties. Bp *Fleetwood* 8*vo*. Dr *Delany* 8*vo*. Dr *S. Clarke*, V. 3. Col. 3. 20. Mr *Wollaſton*'s Rel. of Nat. p. 154. Dr *Stanhope*'s Epiſt. and Goſp. V. 2. p. 25.

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Motives to the enquiry after happineſs --- the poſſibility of obtaining it --- the cauſes of our ill ſucceſs in the purſuit of it. Dr *Lucas* Enquiry after Happineſs. P. 1.

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The vegetable and animal part of our nature how far to be made the object of our concern. Mr *Wollaſton*'s Rel. of Nat. p. 168. Spect. N. 399.

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Againſt ſelf-murder. Bp *Fleetwood*, 3 S. 2 Sam. 17. 23. Mr *Foſter*, V. 3. Exod. 20. 13. Dr *Sherlock* on Death. *Adams* on Self-murder.

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That religion is the chief buſineſs of life. Bp *Blackal*, V. 6. 2 S. Matt. 5. 33.
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On miracles. Bp *Atterbury*, V. 3. Mar. 16. 20. Dr *Conybeare*, Heb. 2. 3.

On prophecy. Bp *Sherlock*, 8*vo*.

On particular prophecies. Bp *Chandler*, 8*vo*.

For a defence of the Goſpel-Revelation placed in a compendious view, ſee Bp *Gibſon*'s three *Paſtoral Letters*.

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The importance of Chriſtianity. Bp *Butler*'s Anal. P. 2. c. 1.

The greatneſs of the ſalvation offer'd in the Goſpel, and the extreme danger of neglecting it. Bp *Stillingfleet*, Dr *Rogers*, V. 2. Dr *S. Clarke*, V. 5. Heb. 2. 3.

The great wiſdom of learning and adhering to religious principles. Dr *Snape*, V. 1. Matt. 7. 24, 25.

See alſo the catalogue of writers upon moral ſubjects given by Bp Wilkins *in his treatiſe of* Prayer and Preaching.

A TABLE

Of ſeveral of the principal Writers in Moral Philoſophy *.

MR *Locke*, when deſired to draw out a ſyſtem of Ethicks, delivered it as his opinion, that "the "Goſpel contains ſo perfect a Body of Ethicks, that "Reaſon may be excuſed from that enquiry, ſince ſhe "may find Man's duty clearer and eaſier in Revelation "than in herſelf." Vol. 3. p. 546. (ſee alſo his treatiſe *on Education*, §. 187.) And the other great Philoſophers of our Country, Laymen as well as Clergymen, ſuch as the Hon. Mr *Boyle* and Sr *Iſ. Newton*, (to mention no other) have both by their writings and example recommended the ſtudy of the *Holy Scriptures*, particularly the books of the *New Teſtament*, as incomparably the moſt inſtructive. And as to the books of the *Old Teſtament*, they are (abſtracted from the conſideration of their divine Authority) no leſs ſuperiour to the writings of meer human compoſition, in point of intrinſick Excellence than they are in Antiquity.

Moſes died about 1456 years before *Chriſt*: With what perſpicuity and force are the great leſſons of Morality taught and urged in the book of *Deuteronomy*? --- *David*, the inſpired penman of the greater part of the book of *Pſalms*, died about 1019 before *Chriſt*: Where is the whole compaſs of Devotion, in the ſeveral forms of Confeſſion, Petition, Supplication, Thankſgiving, Vows and Praiſes, ſo punctually taught, or ſo warmly recommended, as in the book of *Pſalms*? --- *Solomon* died before *Chriſt* about 980. Where are the rules of Wiſdom and Prudence ſo convincingly laid down, as in the book of *Proverbs* and *Eccleſiaſtes*? (*See the Moral, Political, and Oeconomical precepts therein contain'd, judiciouſly methodiz'd by* Dr Joſ. Hall *Bp of* Norwich.)

The moſt antient Prophetical writer is ſuppoſed to be *Jonah*, who propheſied 832 years before *Chriſt*; *Joel* 813; *Amos* 791, and ſo on to *Malachi* the laſt of them,

* *See* (Mr Baker's) *Reflections on learning*, c. 6 and Dr Wotton's *Reflect. on learning*, c. 2 and 28.

who

who propheſied before *Chriſt* 404. Where is vice and impiety of all kinds more juſtly diſplay'd and more fully confuted than in their threats and admonitions? Where do we meet with a more juſt idea of the duties of Natural Religion, --- with more elevated and noble ſentiments concerning the power and majeſty of GOD, --- with more devout expreſſions of that ſubmiſſion and reſignation which is due to His will, --- and of that joy of heart which ariſes from the teſtimony of a good conſcience, than in the ancient book of *Job*? --- To theſe may be added the fine moral reflections, which occur in the Apocryphal books of *Wiſdom* and *Eccleſiaſticus*; the latter of which is ſuppoſed to have been wrote at leaſt 218 years before *Chriſt*.

Several of the wiſe ſayings of the celebrated ſeven wiſe men of Greece, viz. *Thales* of Miletus; *Solon* of Salamis and Athens; *Periander* of Corinth; *Cleobulus* the Carian; *Chilon* of Lacedæmon; *Bias* of Priene; *Pittacus* of Mitylene; have been preſerved. They lived about 600 years before *Chriſt*. --- *J. Fr. Buddæus* has drawn out and illuſtrated them in *Sapientia veterum*; hoc eſt, *Dicta illuſtriora ſeptem Græciæ ſapientum, diſſertationibus aliquot Academicis explicata*. Concerning theſe Wiſe men and their ſayings, as alſo concerning the other Greek Writers hereafter to be mentioned, ſee *Stanley*'s lives of the Philoſophers, and *Fabricius*'s *Bibliotheca Græca*.

Theognis of Megara, and *Phocylides* of Miletus were nearly contemporaries, and lived between 500 and 600 years before *Chriſt*. There are extant under the name of the former Γνῶμαι or plain rules of life in elegiack verſes; and an exhortation to virtue under the name of the latter in hexameters. But the genuineneſs of both pieces is much queſtioned.

Pythagoras died about 506 years before *Chriſt*. He delivered his moral philoſophy in *Symbols*, or ſhort proverbial ſentences of an enigmatical kind; ſome of which are ſtill exſtant. The *Golden verſes* under his name are ſaid to have been wrote by *Empedocles* about 60 years after. *Hierocles* a Platonick Philoſopher, according to ſome in the third, according to others in the fifth century, wrote an ingenious commentary thereupon in Greek.

Some fragments of the *Pythagorean* Philoſophers are found in the collections of *Stobæus*: ſee them publiſh'd in *Gale's opuſcula*, Cant. 1671. 8vo.

Socrates

Socrates of Athens made moral philoſophy the ſubject of his familiar converſations: He left nothing in writing. He died before *Chriſt* 399.

Cebes, an auditor of his, has left an ingenious draught of human life in his Πινακ.

Of the writings of *Æſchines*, another ſcholar of *Socrates*, there are extant three dialogues, upon theſe ſubjects, *Utrum virtus doceri queat? -- Utrum divitiæ ſint verum bonum? -- Utrum mors timeri debeat?*

Plato, another ſcholar of *Socrates*, has delivered no regular draught of Morality; but has treated of ſeveral moral ſubjects in the following dialogues, viz. *De republica*. L. 10. -- *De legibus*. L. 12. -- Philebus, *de ſummo bono*. -- Hipparchus, *de ſtudio lucrandi*. -- Charmides, *de temperantia*. -- Lyſis, *de amicitia*. -- Protagoras, *de moribus ſapientiæ profeſſorum*. -- Meno, *de virtute*. -- Hippias major, *de honeſto*. -- Hippias minor, *de mendacio*. -- Crito, *ubi diſquirit Socrates utrum ſe morte eximeret pretio ab amicis ſoluto*. -- Phædo, *de animæ immortalitate*. -- Alcibiades primus, *de naturâ hominis*. -- Alcibiades ſecundus, *de prece*. He died before *Chriſt* 348.

Xenophon, another ſcholar of *Socrates*, is ſuppoſed in his Απομνημονευμ. to have given a truer draught of *Socrates*'s notions in morality, and his method of treating it, than *Plato*. He died before *Chriſt* 360.

Ariſtoteles, a ſcholar of *Plato*, wrote three regular treatiſes of Ethicks, one intitled by the name of his ſon *Nicomachus*, in ten books; which is moſt eſteemed. The principles thereof are repeated in his *Magna Moralia*, L. 2. and in thoſe addreſſed to *Eudemius*, L. 7. To theſe may be added his treatiſes *de Republica*, L. 8. and *Oeconomica*, L. 2. He died before *Chriſt* 322.

Theophraſtus, a ſcholar firſt of *Plato*, and afterwards of *Ariſtotle*, has left a draught of ſeveral moral characters.

Epictetus lived about A. D. 90. His *Enchiridion* contains a maſterly sketch of what is called the *Stoick* Philoſophy. This piece was wrote by *Arrianus*, a conſtant auditor and ſcholar of his; who has likewiſe preſerved many of his larger diſcourſes upon moral ſubjects. *Simplicius* wrote an exegetical comment upon the *Enchiridion*.

Plutarchus died A. D. 120. He has wrote a great many pieces upon moral ſubjects, viz. *De auditione*. -- Libellus, *quomodo quis ſuos in virtute paranda ſentire poſſit profectus*. -- *De virtute & vitio*. -- *De conſolatione, ad uxorem ſuam*. -- Et *ad Apollonium*. -- *Commentarius, ne ſuaviter quidem vivi poſſe ſecundùm Epicuri decreta, docens*. --

An

An vitioſitas ad infelicitatem ſufficiat. -- *De amore prolis.* -- *De his qui ſero à numine puniuntur.* -- *Virtutem doceri poſſe.* -- *De cohibenda ira.* -- *De curioſitate.* -- *De tranquillitate animi.* -- *De vitioſo pudore.* -- *De fraterno amore.* -- *De garrulitate.* -- *De cupiditate divitiarum.* -- *Animine an corporis affectiones ſint deteriores.* -- *De virtute morali.* -- *De exilio.* -- *De invidia & odio.*

Mar. Aurelius Antoninus Emperor of *Rome* died A. D. 178. He has left moral meditations in 12 books. (*Tho. Gataker* in his learned commentary upon this Author has given a full account of the *Stoick* Philoſophy.)

Maximus Tyrius, an eminent *Platonick* Philoſopher, flouriſh'd about A. D. 170. He has elegantly digeſted his reflections upon ſeveral moral ſubjects in diſtinct Diſſertations.

Latin Writers.

M. T. Cicero died before *Chriſt* 33. Among his writings we have the following upon moral ſubjects. *De finibus* L. 5. in quibus diſquiritur de ſummo bono ſummoque malo. -- *Tuſculanarum Diſputationum* L. 5. viz. de contemnendâ morte. -- de tolerando dolore. -- de ægritudine leniendâ. -- de reliquis animi perturbationibus. -- virtutem ad beate vivendum ſeipsâ eſſe contentam. -- *De legibus* L. 3. -- *De officiis* L. 3. -- *De ſenectute.* -- *De amicitia.* -- *Paradoxa Stoica.*

Publius Syrus lived ſoon after. His moral ſentences in Iambick verſe, ſhort as they are, deſerve mentioning for their elegance and ſmartneſs. -- as do the Fables of *Phædrus.*

Luc. Annæus Seneca, ſometime præceptor to *Nero*, died A. D. 65. His moral writings contain many noble ſentiments, viz. *De ira* L. 3. -- 3 *conſolationes.* -- *De providentiâ.* -- *De tranquillitate animi.* -- *De conſtantiâ ſapientis.* -- *De clementiâ* L. 2. -- *De brevitate vitæ.* -- *De vitâ beatâ.* -- *De otio ſapientis.* -- *De beneficiis* L. 7. -- *Epiſtolæ.*

Among the writings of the *Fathers* we have no regular treatiſe of morality; unleſs the Greek piece of *Clemens Alexandrinus* intituled *Pædagogus*, and the Latin one of *Ambroſius de Officiis*, are to be reckon'd of that ſort. The former lived towards the end of the ſecond Century; the latter, of the fourth. But there are none of the *Fathers*, but what have, in their occaſional treatiſes, ſermons and epiſtles, enlarg'd upon moral ſubjects. Their integrity in deciding caſes of conſcience is al-

low'd on all hands: and their judiciouſneſs in the main (I mean of the more able writers among them,) has been ſhewn by ſuch learned men as have been well acquainted with their writings, and conſequently beſt qualified to judge in the caſe. (*See Dr* Waterland's *Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, c. 7.) And if, (*to uſe the words of Dr* Wotton, *Reflect. on Learning*) at this diſtance, many of their deciſions ſeem over-ſevere, there is as great at leaſt, if not greater, reaſon to ſuſpect that the complaints now adays raiſed againſt them may ariſe from our degeneracy, as from their unwarrantable ſtrictneſs.

Boethius a Chriſtian writer flouriſhed about A. D. 510. He is ſaid to have introduced the ſtudy of *Ariſtotle*'s Philoſophy into the Chriſtian world; ſeveral of whoſe logical pieces he himſelf tranſlated into Latin. He has left a large and elegant ſpecimen of his ſkill in Moral Philoſophy, in his treatiſe, *De conſolatione Philoſophiæ*, L. 5. wrote during his impriſonment, in proſe and verſe.

In the ſixth Century *Iſidorus Hiſpalenſis* made a methodical collection of moral ſentences out of the writings of the *Fathers*; particularly *Auguſtinus* and *Gregorius M.*

This method of common-placing paſſages out of the Fathers grew into frequent uſe in the ſeventh and following Centuries, and laid the foundation of Syſtematical Divinity.

In the 12*th* Century *Petrus Lombardus* compoſed his ſyſtem of Popiſh Divinity, intitled *Sententiæ*: which work quickly grew into ſuch repute as to become a principal ſubject of the ſtudy and commentaries of Divines.

Accordingly *Thomas Aquinas* (who died A. D. 1274.) enlarged much upon the plan of *Lombardus*; as in other Theological points, ſo, particularly by the addition of a ſyſtem of Ethicks in his *Secunda pars ſummæ Theologiæ*; which takes in the whole plan of *Ariſtotle*'s Ethicks *ad Nicomachum*, with additions agreeable to the then received notions in Divinity, and is ſubdivided into two parts; the latter whereof (called *Secunda Secundæ*) treats of the ſeveral virtues and vices diſtinctly, and has been much admired. His manner is to conſider every ſubject in ſeveral different views, ſtarting objections and and offering ſolutions.

And this method was chiefly followed by the ſucceeding tribe of *ſcholaſtick* writers.

Not that all writers in thoſe ages confined themſelves to the dry ſyſtematical way: witneſs that elegance of ſentiment

timent which appears in the moral treatiſes of *Petrarcha* in the 14*th* Century, particularly in the two books of Dialogues, *De remediis utriuſque fortunæ.*

The *Scholaſtick* writers in morality were probably led to ſubtilize their matter ſo very much into curious and ſeemingly unneceſſary queſtions, with a view to qualify Students in Divinity to ſolve caſes of conſcience, which might come before them at times of *Confeſſion.*

(Monſ. *Paſchal* in his Provincial letters has expoſed the principles of ſome *Romiſh* Caſuiſts.)

It would be endleſs to enumerate the ſeveral writers in Ethicks upon the Ariſtotelick plan: I ſhall therefore only mention

Conr. Horneii Philoſophia moralis, ſive civilis doctrinæ de moribus L. 4.

Euſtachii Ethica.

Philoſophia *Burgundiana.*

Heerebordi Collegium Ethicum.

Jac. Thomaſii Breviarium Ethicum Ariſtotelis.

Ethicæ Compendium, *Oxon.* 1743.

Ethices Compendium in uſum Juv. Acad. *Oxon.* 1745.

Of other writers who have not confined themſelves to that plan, I mention

Pet. le Charron (Canon of Condom in France) his large and well digeſted treatiſe of Ethicks under the title *Of Wiſdom.* The book is tranſlated and corrected by Dr *Stanhope* in 3 V. 8*vo.*

Pet. Gaſſendus has drawn out a large treatiſe of moral Philoſophy, fraught with citations from Poets and Philoſophers, particularly the followers of *Epicurus*, of whom *Gaſſendus* was a profeſt admirer and advocate.

Abrah. Sculteti Ethicorum L. 2

Barth. Kekermanni ſyſtema Ethicum.

Henr. Mori Enchiridion Ethicum.

Gottl. Heineccii Elementa Philoſophiæ moralis, *Amſtel.* 1740. 8*vo.*

Ethicæ Compendium, *Glaſguæ* 1742.

Of writers who have profeſſedly taken the *Chriſtian* doctrines of Morality into their account, ſee

Jo. Cirellii (i. e. *Crellii*) Ethica Ariſtotelica ad ſacrarum literarum normam emendata. And

Ethica Epitome.

Dan. Weithy Ethices Compendium, *Lond.* 1724. 8*vo.*

J. F. Oſtervald Ethica Chriſtiana.

Ant.

Ant. Walei Compendium Ethicæ Ariſtotelicæ ad Chriſtianæ veritatis normam revocatum.

To theſe may be added moſt of the modern ſyſtematical writers in Divinity.

Phil. Limborch Theologia Chriſtiana L. 2. and 5.

Turretini Theologia Elenchtica, Loc. undecimus.

The Whole Duty of Man.

Dr *Fiddes* Body of Divinity.

The ſeveral expoſitors of the Decalogue in our Church-Catechiſm, particularly Dr *Hammond*'s Practical Catechiſm.

I add, (tho' they treat only of ſome particular queſtions in moral Philophy,) *Rob. Sanderſon* Prælectiones de Conſcientia & de Juramento.

Hugo Grotius was the firſt who reduc'd the Law of Nature and Nations into a regular ſyſtem, in his treatiſe *de Jure Belli & Pacis*. It was firſt publiſh'd at Paris 1625. It has been often reprinted with various improvements, particularly by Mr *Barbeyrac*, 2 Vol. 8*vo*. by whom 'tis tranſlated into French. 'Tis publiſh'd likewiſe in Engliſh.

Phil. Rein. Vitriarius publiſh'd an epitome of it intitled, *Inſtitutiones juris naturæ & gentium*. — ſo has *Jo. Scheffer* in his *Grotius enucleatus*.

The great reputation obtain'd by *Grotius* thereby is ſaid to have incited Mr *John Selden* to write his treatiſe, *De jure Naturæ & Gentium juxta diſciplinam Hebræorum*. Lond. 1640.

J. Fr. Buddæus has given a compendium of it, intitled *Synopſis juris Naturæ & Gentium*, &c.

Dr *Rich. Cumberland*, afterwards Bp of *Peterborough*, wrote his valuable treatiſe, *De Legibus Naturæ*, in oppoſition to the principles of *Thom. Hobbes*. Lond. 1672. — 'Tis tranſlated into Engliſh, with notes, &c. by Mr *Maxwell*, — and lately publiſh'd in French, with notes, by Mr *Barbeyrac*. Amſt. 1744.

Sam. Puffendorf's excellent work, *De jure Naturæ & Gentium*, was firſt publiſh'd 1672. 'Tis tranſlated into Engliſh by Dr *Baſ. Kennet* and others; to which tranſlation are now annex'd Mr *Barbeyrac*'s large notes: by which latter it was tranſlated into French. Mr *Puffendorf* made a very uſeful abridgment of his own work, under the title *De Officio Hominis & Civis*; which has been tranſlated into French by Mr *Barbeyrac*, and into Engliſh by Dr *Took*.

This

This ſmaller work of *Puffendorf* has been often publiſh'd with uſeful notes aud commentaries, particularly by *Immanuel Weberus*, --- *Ev. Otto*, --- *Gottl. Gerh. Titius*, --- *Sam. Treverus*, --- *J. Jac. Lehmannus*, &c. and lately Mr *Th. Johnſon*, Cantab.

The foregoing works of *Grotius*, *Cumberland* and *Puffendorf* have greatly contributed to the ſtudy of the Law of Nature and Nations, and given occaſion to ſeveral learned treatiſes of morality abroad upon the ſame general plan, ſomething diverſified in particulars, ſuch as,
J. Fr. Buddæi Elementa Philoſophiæ practicæ.
Gottl. Heineccii Elementa Juris Naturæ & Gentium.
Jo. Chriſt. Wolfii Philoſophia moralis, 4*to*.

Among the Engliſh diſcourſes I have already mention'd
Mr *Wollaſton*'s Religion of Nature delineated.
Bp *Butler*'s Sermons, and Analogy.
Dr *Rutherforth*'s Eſſay on Virtue.
Mr *Hutcheſon*'s Enquiry, and his treatiſe on the Paſſions.
Mr *Balguy*'s Letters and Tracts.

I am to add, Dr *Turnbull*'s Principles of Moral and Chriſtian Philoſophy, 2 Vol. 8*vo*.
Mr *Pope*'s Eſſay on Man.

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FINIS.

Lately publiſh'd, by the ſame Author,

The Connection between Irreligion *and* Immorality. pr. 6*d*.
Alſo:
Reflections on the nature and uſefulneſs of Logick. The ſecond Edition.

Books Printed for and Sold by *James Fletcher* in the *Turl*, OXFORD.

XXXIX Articuli Eccleſiæ Anglicanæ, textibus Sacr. Script. & Patrum primævorum Teſtimoniis confirmati, brevibuſque Notis illuſtrati. Adjectis inſuper Nominibus Auctorum locisque in quibus Doctrina in Articulis contenta fuſius explicatur. Auctore Edv. Welchman Archidiacono Cardigan.

Xenophontis Memorabilium Socratis Dictorum Libri IV, Græcè & Latinè, cum notis Integris Erneſti aliorumque ſelectis; nunc variis etiam novis obſervationibus adaucti & illuſtrati. Huic Editioni accedunt Capitum, Verborum & Phraſium Indices locupletiſſimi.

Anglia Judaica: or the Hiſtory and Antiquities of the Jews in England, collected from all our Hiſtorians, both Printed and Manuſcript, as alſo from the Records in the Tower, and other publick Repoſitories, by D'Bloſſiers Tovey L.L.D. and Principal of New-Inn Hall, Oxon. 4to.

The Caſe of the Miniſterial Maintenance ſtated. A Sermon preach'd at the Triennial Viſitation of the Right Reverend Father in God Thomas Lord Biſhop of Sarum, by John Spry B.D.

The Doctrine of a Future State, neceſſary to the Welfare and Support of Civil Government. A Sermon preach'd at the Aſſizes, held at Warwick, March 28. 1739, by William Cleaver M.A.

The Time of our Saviour's coming conſider'd, as to its Fitneſs and Propriety. A Sermon preach'd before the Univerſity of Oxford, on Sunday, Mar. 6. 1742-3, By William Cleaver M.A.

Defence of Church Muſick. A Sermon preach'd in the Cathedral Church of Hereford, at the Anniverſary Meeting of the three Choirs, Worceſter, Gloceſter and Hereford, by Thomas Payne M.A.

The Jewiſh Diſpenſation conſidered and vindicated with a View to the Objections of Unbelievers, and particularly of a late Author call'd the Moral Philoſopher. A Sermon preach'd before the Univerſity of Oxford, by Francis Webber M.A.

The Caſe of Authority conſider'd, as it reſpects Religion, particularly the Chriſtian. A Sermon preach'd at the Aſſizes, held at Oxford, July 29. 1742, by Francis Webber M.A.

Mr. Hole's Sermon preach'd at the Conſecration of the Pariſh Church of Werrington, Devon.

Reflections on the natural Foundation of the high Antiquity of Government, Arts, and Sciences in Egypt.

An Enquiry into the Scripture Doctrine concerning Future Puniſhment, occaſion'd by ſome late writings, particularly Mr. Whiſton's Diſcourſe of Hell Torments, by Matt. Horbery B. D. Fellow of Magd. Coll. Oxon.

The Connection between Irreligion and Immorality. A Sermon preach'd at the Aſſizes held at Oxford, March 1. 1743-4. by Ed. Bentham B. D.

The Nature and Reaſonableneſs of the Inward Call and Outward Miſſion to the Holy Miniſtry Conſider'd. A Sermon preach'd before the Right Rev. Father in God THOMAS Lord Biſhop of Oxford, at the Ordination at Chriſt Church, on Sunday Dec. 22. 1745. and before the Univerſity of Oxford, at St Mary's Mar. 2. 1745-6. by William Parker M. A. Fellow of Balliol College in Oxford.

Plu-

Plutarchi Demoſthenis & Ciceronis Vitæ Parallelæ nunc primum ſeparatim editæ. Græca recenſuit, Latine reddidit, notis illuſtravit, Phil. Barton A. B. Coll. Nov. Socius.

The Genuineneſs of Lord Clarendon's Hiſtory vindicated, Mr Oldmixon's Slander confuted, and the true State of the Caſe repreſented, by John Burton B. D. Fellow of Eton College.

The Folly and Wickedneſs of Miſplacing our Truſt and Confidence. A Sermon preach'd before the Univerſity of Oxford on Wedneſday April 9. 1744. being the Day appointed for a General Faſt, by John Burton B. D. Fellow of Eton College.

The Inſpiration of the Moral Parts of Scripture aſſerted. A Sermon preach'd at the Triennial Viſitation of the Right Rev. Father in God Richard Lord Biſhop of Lichfield and Coventry Aug. 29. 1744. by Matt. Horbery B. D. Fellow of Magd. Coll. Oxon.

The Influence of Education juſtified with Regard to the Profeſſion of Chriſtianity. A Sermon preach'd before the Univerſity of Oxford at Saint Mary's May 6. 1744. by John Spry B. D. Vicar of Hendred in Berks.

Appendix Liviana, continens I. Selectas Codicum MSS. & Editionum antiquarum Lectiones, præcipuas Variorum Emendationes, & Supplementa Lacunarum in iis T. Livii qui ſuperſunt Libris. II. J. Freinſhemii Supplementorum Libros X. in locum Decadis ſecundæ Livianæ deperditæ. In uſum Juventutis Academicæ.

Platonis Dialogi Quinque Gr. Lat. Recenſuit, notiſque illuſtravit Nath. Forſter A. M. Coll. Corp. Chriſti Oxon.

Famiani Stradæ Proluſiones Academicæ.

Enquiry into the Medicinal Virtues of Briſtol-Water, and the Indications of Cure which it anſwers, by George Randolph M. D.

The Eternity of Future Puniſhment aſſerted and vindicated. In Anſwer to Mr Whiſton's late Treatiſe on that Subject. In two Sermons preach'd before the Univerſity of Oxford, by William Dodwell M. A.

The Deſireableneſs of the Chriſtian Faith illuſtrated and apply'd. A Sermon preach'd at the Triennial Viſitation of the Right Rev. Father in God Thomas Lord Biſhop of Sarum held at Reading on Thurſday Aug. 30. 1744. by William Dodwell M. A.

The Nature, Procedure, Extent, Value and Effects of a Rational Faith Conſidered. In two Sermons preach'd before the Univerſity of Oxford, by William Dodwell M. A.

The Practical Influence of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity repreſented. A Sermon preach'd before the Univerſity of Oxford, on Trinity Sunday, 1745. by William Dodwell M. A.

The Conjugation of French Verbs, with their Syntaxis, according to Father Buffier's Plan.

A Mechanical Enquiry into the Nature, Cauſes, Seat, and Cure of the Diabetes. With an Explication of the moſt remarkable Symptoms.

Xenophontis de Cyri Expedit. Lib. Septem. Græca recognavit, cum Codicibus MStis & omnibus fere Libris editis contulit, plurimis in locis emendavit, Verſionem Lat. reformavit, obſervat. ſuis, Tabula Geographica & Indice Geographico auxit & illuſtravit; Notas Hen. Stephani, Leunclavii, Æ. Porti & Mureti recenſitas & caſtigatas, & Variant. Lectionum delectum, adjunxit Thomas Hutchinſon, 8vo Edit. 2da.

Books lately Printed in SCOTLAND, and Sold by *James Fletcher* in the *Turl*, OXFORD.

Pindari Opera omnia quæ extant. Olympia, Pythia, Iſthmia, cum Interpretatione Latina.

Epicteti Enchiridion, Cebetis Tabula, Prodici Hercules, & Cleanthis Hymnus. Omnia Græce & Latine.

Theophraſti Characteres Ethici, ex recenſione Petri Needham, cum Verſione Latina Is. Caſauboni.

Demetrius Phalereus de Elocutione, ſive Dictione Rhetorica. In hac Editione, contextus Græcus ex optimis Exemplaribus emendatur, Verſio Latina paſſim ab erroribus repurgatur; & Loca à Demetrio laudata, quæ hactenus Græce tantum extabant, nunc primum Latinitate donantur.

M. T. Ciceronis de Natura Deorum Libri tres. Accedunt Boherii, Daviſii & aliorum inſigniores Lectiones Variantes & Conjecturæ.

M. T. Ciceronis Tuſculanarum Diſputationum Libri quinque. Accedunt Lectiones Variantes, & Doctorum, præcipue Cl. Bouherli Conjecturæ.

P. Terentii Afri Comœdiæ ſex: ex editione Weſterhoviana Recenſitæ ad Fidem duodecim amplius MStorum Codicum, & pluſcularum optimæ Notæ Editionum.

Phædri Auguſti Liberti, Fabularum Æſopicarum Libri quinque: ex editione Burmanni.

Hutcheſon Philoſophiæ moralis Inſtitutio compendiaria, Ethices & Juriſprudentiæ naturalis Elementa continens.

Synopſis Metaphyſicæ, Ontologiam & Pneumatologiam complectens per Hutcheſon.

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The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, newly tranſlated from the Greek, with Notes, and an Account of his Life.

Select Sermons of Dr. Whichcot, in 2 parts, with a Preface by the Earl of Shaftsbury.

Novum Teſtamentum Græcum, cura Rhuddimanni.

Eleven Sermons on ſeveral Subjects, by Bp. Burnet.

More on the Attributes and Providence of God, with a recommendatory Preface by Hutcheſon.

Inſtructions to a Son, containing Rules of Conduct in publick and private Life, by Archibald Marquis of Argyle.

A Plan of Education, by the Chevalier Ramſay.

The Gentle Shepherd, a Scots Paſtoral Comedy, by Allan Ramſay.

Sir Tho. More's Utopia in Engliſh, by Bp. Burnet.